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Jennifer Mueller* 
ABSTRACT 
The struggle to reconcile individual liberty with the need for collective enterprise, a perennial question at law, has 
been particularly acute of late.  In cases like Citizens United v. FEC, Harris v. Quinn, and Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court has re-assessed dissenters’ ability to exit various joint funding schemes, 
raising questions about the limits of group activity and the power of the government to address systemic problems. 
Many litigants asserting “opt-out” rights argue that a challenged law forces them to subsidize speech in violation 
of the First Amendment.  The Court’s recent responses to such claims have both departed from precedent and 
revealed deep inconsistencies in the doctrine.  These tensions are captured in the Paycheck Problem, which con-
templates a public employee who has strong feelings on a matter of public policy yet is required to financially 
support speech contrary to his views through his taxes, union agency fee, and pension contribution.  The Article 
reviews the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s cases in these areas and demonstrates how the Court’s recent decisions 
sharply diverge in the opt-out rights provided in the union and corporate contexts.  In addition to doctrinal tensions 
previously observed with regard to individuals forced to subsidize an organization’s political spending (allowed in 
the corporate context but prohibited for unions), this Article observes that the Court’s recent rulings could be read 
to give a dissenting corporate shareholder a First Amendment claim based on a vast array of corporate activities 
traditionally subject to the most deferential of judicial review.  Among other things, such a conclusion would deeply 
destabilize public pensions. 
This is not an argument for First Amendment anarchy, but for a new limiting principle, which the Article demon-
strates through adding to the existing union and corporate law conversations an analysis of the Court’s tax and 
government speech cases, in which the Court has reached the right result but not for the right reasons.  The Article 
concludes by outlining three possible paths forward at a time when the Supreme Court, with a new Justice in 
place, finds itself at a crossroads on these questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If one is in search of a unifying theory of the First Amendment, it is best 
to keep moving past the Supreme Court’s compelled subsidy of speech cases.  
In recent years litigants have beaten a regular path to the Court asserting a 
constitutional right to avoid contributing funds to various collective 
schemes—most of which are designed to benefit the litigants themselves—
because they object to an expressive component of the challenged program.1  
Although the Court has now had the opportunity to consider similar argu-
ments across a range of contexts, its pronouncements in this area have not 
coalesced around any organizing principle to determine if and when the First 
Amendment requires that collective enterprises provide their participants 
 
 1 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“For the third time in eight 
years, we consider whether a Federal program that finances generic advertising to promote an ag-
ricultural product violates the First Amendment.”); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014) 
(addressing a challenge to mandatory fees for a quasi-public union); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (addressing a challenge to mandatory fees for a public 
union), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016). 
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exit rights.  If anything, the Court’s lines of analysis have become ever more 
difficult to reconcile.2  This has implications for both constitutional theory 
and organizational practice. 
This Article explores the Court’s compelled subsidy jurisprudence 
through reference to a hypothetical—but hardly far-fetched—real-world sce-
nario.  Imagine a state police officer, Sam.  Every month, Sam’s paycheck 
reflects several automatic deductions, including federal tax withholdings, un-
ion dues, and a mandatory contribution to the state’s pension fund.  Like 
many state law enforcement officers, Sam works in a unionized workplace.3  
He was once a union supporter, but now he strongly disagrees with his union’s 
support for body-worn cameras (“BWCs”).4  Sam can opt out of full union 
membership if he wishes to withdraw his support from the union’s political 
activities, but he still must pay a reduced monthly amount as an agency or 
“fair share” fee to cover a pro rata portion of the services the union is required 
to provide to all employees, such as training, grievance procedures, contract 
administration, and collective bargaining—the very bargaining process in 
which the union is negotiating for widespread adoption of BWCs.5  To pour 
salt on a wound, Sam has recently learned that his state pension fund, to 
which he is also required to contribute, is invested in a leading manufacturer 
of BWCs.6  This company has lobbied for public BWC funding, run adver-
tisements in favor of politicians who support widespread adoption of BWCs, 
and negotiated contracts with state and federal governments for the purchase 
of additional BWCs and support services.  Finally, Sam is also upset that the 
federal government is promoting BWCs and has proposed spending millions 
of dollars—including his tax dollars—to increase their use.7   
 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—2016 (Jan. 26, 
2017) [hereinafter BLS 2015 Labor Data], https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf; see 
also Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Police and Detectives, OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives. 
htm#tab-5 (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) (“Most police and detectives belonged to a union in 2016.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Roy Klabin, The Case Against Police Body Cameras, DAILY BANTER (May 13, 2015), 
http://thedailybanter.com/2015/05/the-case-against-police-body-cameras/ (noting some law en-
forcement, civil liberty, and public administration objections to pervasive use of police body cam-
eras); Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body Cameras, TIME (May 4, 2015), http://time.com/ 
3843157/the-problem-with-police-body-cameras/ (explaining via case studies how video evidence 
frequently fails to provide objective clarity to the factfinder). 
 5 See infra note 98. 
 6 See Ben Geier, Body Cam Stocks Are Soaring After Obama Urges Greater Use by Police, FORTUNE (Dec. 2, 
2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/02/taser-obama-congress-ferguson/ (indicating that BWC 
manufacturers are often both publicly traded and appealing investments); Rich Smith, Body Cameras 
for Police: How They Work, Who Makes Them, and Stocks You Can Buy, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 14, 2014, 
12:17 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/09/14/body-cameras-for-police-
how-they-work-who-makes-th.aspx. 
 7 See Fact Sheet: Strengthening Community Policing, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Dec. 
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Sam does not want his money to support any of these expressive activities.  
The Constitution protects Sam’s right to speak his mind on BWCs.8  Does it 
also give him the right to refuse to pay his taxes, union fees, and pension 
contribution because these payments constitute the compelled subsidy of 
speech that he opposes?  Is there a principled way to reconcile the Court’s 
rulings in this area? 
This is the Paycheck Problem, and it provides a compact and timely plat-
form from which to examine shifts that the Supreme Court has signaled in 
its recent First Amendment rulings and consider our own intuitions about 
money, speech, and the Constitution.  It is compact because, although span-
ning three areas of law, the hypothetical removes from the First Amendment 
analysis considerations of state action or compulsion; both are assumed.9  It 
is timely because in recent years the question of “opt-out rights” has assumed 
an ever more prominent role in public debate and in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.10  Indeed, the death of Justice Antonin Scalia left unresolved 
one of the very questions presented in the Paycheck Problem: whether a pub-
lic employee can be required to pay an agency fee to a union that represents 
him but that he has declined to join.11  In late September 2017, as this Article 
 
1, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet-strengthening-
community-policing (including increased use of police body cameras among its recommendations). 
 8 He may not, however, have the right to both keep his job and speak his mind.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Consti-
tution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). 
 9 I also leave to one side the opt-in/opt-out question and the question of state restrictions on union 
payroll deductions.  See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (upholding a state 
law that allowed public-sector unions to collect general union dues but not support for its political 
activities through payroll deductions); Brian Olney, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When Gov-
ernment “Subsidies” Silence Political Speech, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 881, 909 (2014) (critiquing Ysursa as 
inconsistent with other First Amendment rulings). 
 10 See Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications 
of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 62, (2013) (arguing that nearly 
every constitutional issue can be framed as a question of unconstitutional conditions, and that “plac-
ing exit and sorting at the center of constitutional law, rather than at its periphery, opens new 
directions for constitutional theory in the United States”); Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. 
L. REV. 893, 894–95 (2014) (“At the heart of the new paradigm of constitutional rights . . . is a right 
to ‘opt out’ of some central public or civic project. . . . The particular exit rights that I enumerate—
that is, the rights to exit from the benefits and responsibilities of public projects, including public 
education, publicly funded policing, civil rights commitments, and public health projects—harm 
civil society in profound ways not appreciated by rights critics in the 1970s and 1980s.”). 
 11 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (deadlocking 4-4 on a case that sought to 
overturn longstanding precedent upholding public union agency fees for activity related to the un-
ion’s required duties); see Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-su-
preme-court-nominee.html?_r=0 (discussing  Justice Neil Gorsuch’s views and their relationship to 
the balance of power on key issues before the Court). 
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was going to press, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari on that issue 
in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31.12 
Justice Scalia joined with those Justices on the Roberts Court who have 
taken an increasingly robust interpretation of the First Amendment’s exhor-
tation that the government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech,”13 and in many ways the story of the Paycheck Problem is the story 
of the Court’s shifting First Amendment analysis.14  As described below, in 
recent decades the Court has expanded the scope of speech covered by the 
First Amendment, it has elided the distinction between direct and indirect 
restrictions on speech, and it has increasingly focused on the burden to indi-
vidual autonomy that speech restrictions impose rather than their impact on 
public discourse.15  Each of these trends has a special resonance in the context 
of compelled speech (as opposed to direct speech restrictions), and each has 
contributed to the Court’s increased skepticism towards collective funding 
initiatives.  Taken together, these shifts have sparked concerns that the cur-
rent Court is using the First Amendment as a deregulatory hatchet much the 
way that the Lochner-era Court once employed due process and freedom of 
contract.16  The concern is particularly acute where, as with taxes, unions, or 
pensions, the challenged program represents a collective effort to address a 
diffuse but significant societal issue. 
Yet this First Amendment “dismantling” has been piecemeal and incon-
sistent.  For example, in recent years the Court has relied on the First Amend-
ment to re-visit the question of whether employees can be required to fund 
public-sector unions’ collective bargaining activities, challenging decades-old 
 
 12 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom., Janus v. Am. Fed’n, 138 S. Ct. 54 (mem.); see infra 
notes 134, 360.  
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding, in a majority opinion which Justice Scalia 
joined, mandatory agency fees for a quasi-public union violated First Amendment). 
 15 See infra Parts I.A–B. 
 16 See, e.g., Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343, 2345 (2014) (warn-
ing that “to apply a heightened First Amendment standard when a court is reviewing an ordinary 
economic regulatory program, merely because there may be some indirect effect on private speech 
caused by the challenged regulations, would return us to the Lochner era and sharply undermine con-
gressional authority”); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 
1207 (2015) (“In the early twentieth century, businesses articulated similar antiregulatory sentiment 
in other terms.  This was the Lochner era. . . . [I]n their structure, the claims of the past resemble those 
of the present.”); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 880 (2015) (“Vir-
tually all commercial transactions are consummated through contracts, and all contracts exist in the 
medium of language.  If the First Amendment were interpreted to endow commercial speakers with 
autonomy interests in the words of their contracts, Lochner would be revived.”); Amanda Shanor, The 
New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135 (“[A] growing number of scholars, commentators, and 
judges have likened aspects of recent First Amendment jurisprudence to Lochner v. New York’s antica-
nonical liberty of contract.” (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905))). 
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case law allowing such assessments.17  Even as it has shown solicitude for the 
First Amendment interests of union-shop employees, however, the Court has 
struck down laws protecting the constitutional interests of corporate share-
holders, whose investments now may be channeled by corporations into in-
dependent political expenditures with which the shareholder may disagree.18 
This Article joins with recent scholarship that examines the tension be-
tween the Court’s treatment of compelled support for union political activi-
ties, on the one hand, and corporate political activities, on the other.19  Un-
ions have long been barred from using their mandatory fees for political 
expenditures unrelated to the union’s core responsibilities.  Political activities 
must be funded by additional voluntary contributions, payment of which 
makes one a full union member rather than just a “covered” or “agency 
shop” employee.  In the 1977 case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court 
explained that this arrangement safeguards employees’ core First Amend-
ment rights.20  Yet in its 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme 
Court broke with precedent to allow corporations to use unlimited general 
treasury funds on independent political advertisements.21  Surely, commen-
tators argued, the First Amendment rights of shareholders and pension fund 
members are likewise jeopardized when corporations use their investments 
for political purposes.22  The emphasis in the scholarship to date has been on 
finding a pragmatic work-around to this dilemma, such as disclosure of cor-
porate political spending or a change in union structure.23  A related analysis 
 
 17 See, e.g., Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643 (holding mandatory agency fees for a quasi-public union violated 
First Amendment).  While the Court has restricted its analysis to public-sector unions, it would not 
be difficult to extend its logic to private unions. 
 18 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (finding that restrictions on “electioneering 
communications” by corporations chill speech protected by the First Amendment).  But see Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014) (citing the rights of individual share-
holders to the free exercise of religion, as protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb, in overturning the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate for closely-held 
corporations). 
 19 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights 
of Dissenting Employees Under the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 344 (2011) (article 
published prior to changing name to Eric John Finseth Alden); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corpora-
tions, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012). 
 20 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 229 (1977). 
 21 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 22 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. 
SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2013) (“Citizens United v. 
FEC . . . dismissed in a few sentences the idea that corporate leadership’s use of corporate resources 
on politics might infringe on the rights of dissenting shareholders.”).  See  generally Victor Brudney, 
Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (discuss-
ing, in the first major piece of scholarship to address this issue, whether First Amendment rights are 
extended to stockholders during the corporate decisionmaking process); Sachs, supra note 19. 
 23 See supra note 18; see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-in Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU 
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proposes that employees contributing to a public pension should have the 
right to withhold funds for a pro rata portion of the shares voted by pension 
boards to advance a political or ideological purpose (for example, a resolution 
promoting a diverse board of directors or a shareholder proposal introducing 
corporate climate change objectives).24   
This Article argues that there are even more significant implications of 
the Court’s holdings that cannot be remedied by the thoughtful solutions al-
ready proposed.  Since Citizens United, the Court has moved the even further 
from its traditional balancing approach, holding that compelled subsidies im-
pose a First Amendment burden akin to compelled speech itself and articu-
lating a broad definition of speech that one cannot be compelled to fund, 
sweeping into its ambit the kind of speech that corporations engage in quite 
regularly—for example, speech that might impact a federal or state budget.25  
These decisions parallel the approach the Court has taken in recent cases 
challenging speech restrictions (as opposed to compelled contributions), 
which increasingly apply a heightened or “exacting” level of scrutiny to laws 
affecting even routine commercial speech.26  Taking the Court at its word 
would imply that it is not only corporations’ newfound ability to engage in 
overtly political speech that may create a First Amendment cause of action 
for shareholders, but also business activities that we have traditionally viewed 
as existing in a corporate law sphere quite separate from constitutional law 
inquiries, such as contract negotiations and lobbying initiatives.  At the very 
least, the Court’s recent holdings make one struggle to identify constitution-
ally meaningful grounds to distinguish pension contributions from agency 
fees for the purposes of a compelled speech analysis.  If Sam can withhold his 
union agency fee, why can he not also withhold his pension contribution? 
The Paycheck Problem does not insist on false equivalencies, but it does 
surface significant similarities in an effort to bring some rigor to an area of 
jurisprudence long recognized as inconsistent and haphazard.27  Union 
agency fees, pension contributions, and taxes rest in distinct legal fields, but 
 
Could Mean for Post-Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 MONT. L. REV. 101, 127 (2013). 
 24 See Finseth Alden, supra note 19, at 344. 
 25 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014) (holding that one may not be compelled to sub-
sidize a quasi-public union’s speech because, inter alia, it addresses maters of public concern, such 
as potential increases in state Medicaid expenditures, which could impact the state budget). 
 26 See infra Part I.A. 
 27 Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 662 (2003) (criticizing the 
Court’s application of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), as resulting in 
“a jurisprudence of deception and inconsistency—one that sporadically strikes down the occasional 
governmental act or pronouncement for violating the Barnette prohibitions while more often winking 
at (or explaining away or, most often, simply not noticing) massive transgressions”); see also Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1052 (“[E]ven in the area of compelled contributions, the Court has 
been markedly inconsistent in deciding whether there is a First Amendment violation.”). 
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the parallels among them, particularly between union and pensions, are such 
that the Court’s current First Amendment cases make it surprisingly chal-
lenging to identify a distinguishing line that reflects something other than 
scale or degree (or pure policy preference).28  The practical difficulties of rec-
onciling the Court’s holdings thus expose a more theoretical conundrum: ap-
plying the Court’s recent compelled subsidy of speech jurisprudence across 
the range of relevant contexts would be societally destabilizing, but treating 
each challenge as a discrete occasion to announce a new rule of law would 
be constitutionally erratic.   
To resolve this paradox, this Article brings into the analysis the Court’s 
“government speech” line of cases, which announced a blanket rule barring 
First Amendment challenges to any assessments that could be considered a 
federal tax—a theoretically unmoored move that at least one scholar deemed 
a judicial “ipse dixit”—and reconsiders them to identify a more principled 
basis for decision in the area of compelled subsidies.29  The goal is not to arrive 
at the same outcome for each of the three areas in which Sam wants to with-
hold his financial support, but to locate a consistent rationale for determining 
when the Constitution requires cooperative endeavors to allow opt-outs. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of the rele-
vant case law that analyzes the constitutionality of compelled subsidies in 
each of these three areas—taxes, unions, and pensions—with particular at-
tention to more recent cases that expand the First Amendment penumbra 
and emphasize the role of the First Amendment in protecting individual au-
tonomy.  Part II engages with the question at the heart of the Paycheck Prob-
lem: are compelled payments in these three areas constitutionally distinguish-
able?  It examines grounds for treating pensions differently from unions for 
First Amendment purposes, considering both factors suggested by other 
scholars and proposing new ones.  It then looks at the explanations the Court 
has offered in rejecting a right to opt out of taxes and questions why these 
justifications would not apply equally well to union agency fees and pension 
contributions.  The Article concludes, among other things, that union agency 
fees and pension contributions create a similar First Amendment burden for 
a dissenter, yet the Court treats them quite differently.  Conversely, taxes 
truly are different, but the Court has not articulated a theory—other than 
 
 28 Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled 
Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 461 (2014) (“[W]hat is amusing about Harris is that it is the Re-
publican-appointed Justices who are both activist and anti-state’s rights here, substituting their pol-
icy views about the importance of certain labor contract terms for those of the Illinois legislature 
and governor about a matter of state governance.”); Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How 
the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality, 3 UTAH L. REV. 389, 419 (2014) (comparing, inter 
alia, union political activity cases with corporate political activity cases). 
 29 See Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 195, 197 (2005). 
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sheer size—that this is so.  This is because the Court has failed to offer a 
consistent theory of what the First Amendment protects and why. 
These discussions illustrate the need to identify a new limiting principle in 
First Amendment compelled subsidy of speech cases.  The final Part takes up 
this challenge.  Part III suggests three ways the Court might move forward with 
its First Amendment jurisprudence.  It could fall back and regroup around a 
workable definition of protected speech, degree of burden, and levels of scrutiny 
(the “functional” path); it could embrace its current expansive approach as to 
both speech coverage and individual autonomy, which would require adding 
to its current analysis an acknowledgment of the potential First Amendment 
harm that opt-outs pose to others participating in a cooperative enterprise (the 
“individual” path); or it could re-focus its First Amendment jurisprudence to 
advance the operational purpose of the First Amendment in supporting and 
sustaining our constitutional democracy (the “structural” path).  While any of 
these paths would be an improvement over the Court’s current ad hoc doctrine, 
the structural path is both nuanced and systematic and thus holds the most 
promise for rationalizing the Court’s approach to these cases. 
The questions posed by the Paycheck Problem are not merely academic.  
The Court’s shifting rhetoric has very real implications for public law and 
private ordering.  Approximately 150 million individual tax returns were 
filed in the United States in 2017.30  In 2016, roughly 38% of public employ-
ees—close to 8 million individuals—were represented by unions, and nearly 
35% were full union members.31  Another 7.4 million workers are union 
members in the private sector.32  State and local pension plans had more 
than 20 million members in 2016, and over 10 million beneficiaries.33  The 
rhetoric around the 2016 presidential election suggested that there are many 
individuals, like Officer Sam, who would like to opt out of paying their taxes, 
union dues, or pension contributions.34  The question is whether the First 
Amendment provides them an avenue to do so. 
 
 30 Brett Collins, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2011–2018, IRS (2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12rswinbulreturnfilings.pdf. 
 31 BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3. 
 32 See id. 
 33 PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE- AND 
LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY BRIEF: 2016 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/econ/g16-aspp-
sl.pdf.  By way of comparison, fewer than 700 individuals “maxed out” in political contributions 
the election cycle before the Supreme Court ruled that BCRA’s aggregate contribution limit vio-
lated the First Amendment.  See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Bob Biersack, 
McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why/. 
 34 See, e.g., John Cassidy, What Do the Brexit Movement and Donald Trump Have in Common?, NEW YORKER 
(June 23, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/what-do-the-brexit-movement-
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I.  THE CHANGING JURISPRUDENCE OF COMPELLED  
SUBSIDY CHALLENGES 
A.  Setting the Scene 
A few points help to frame the discussion that follows.  First, this is a mo-
ment of ascendancy for First Amendment challenges to a wide array of laws.  
In most cases the Court continues to recite the traditional First Amendment 
“balancing test,” which asks whether a challenged regulation restricts “cov-
ered” speech and then, based on the nature of the speech affected, what degree 
of scrutiny is warranted.35  Under this approach, restrictions on political speech 
are most closely scrutinized—there must be a close fit between a legitimate 
government objective and the speech burden, and the restriction must con-
comitantly be as limited as possible—and other categories less so.36  However, 
the test’s continued viability as a workable standard is increasingly in doubt.  
In recent years the Court has expanded its First Amendment penumbra and 
now reviews restrictions on even commercial speech and viewpoint-neutral 
laws with something approaching exacting scrutiny.37  As Professor Fredrick 
Schauer recently observed, these developments represent a sea change:   
 
and-donald-trump-have-in-common (comparing the movement for the United Kingdom to with-
draw from the EU to the pro-Trump populist movement); Timothy Noah, Does Labor Have a Death 
Wish?, POLITICO MAG.: HIST. DEPARTMENT (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/maga-
zine/story/2017/11/07/labor-movement-trump-betrayal-215796 (noting that a majority of union 
members voted for Trump despite his support for anti-union “right to work” laws).  
 35 See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, 
and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291 (2016) (discussing how the differing types of 
speech have traditionally warranted differing degrees of scrutiny).  But see United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people 
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”). 
 36 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 (1976) 
(recognizing that some restrictions on commercial speech are subject to First Amendment review, 
albeit at a lower standard of scrutiny than restrictions on political speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); United States v. Edge 
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). 
 37 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557–59 (2011) (employing “heightened” First 
Amendment scrutiny to strike down a state law that prohibited pharmacies from selling doctor’s 
prescription records to data mining companies without the doctor’s permission); Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224, 2228 (2015) (striking down sign ordinances that applied different 
size and placement criteria to different signs depending on their content and announcing sweeping 
rule that a “law that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the govern-
ment’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ 
in the regulated speech,” potentially jeopardizing many subject-specific regulations (citation omit-
ted)); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789, 799 (2011) (applying strict scru-
tiny when considering a First Amendment challenge to a law criminalizing the sale or rental of 
violent video games to minors); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (sustaining a First Amendment challenge to 
a law that criminalized the production of videos depicting animal cruelty). 
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In the past, many of the most important issues surrounding the First Amend-
ment were issues about the nature and degree of its protection within its 
widely acknowledged coverage.  But now the pressure appears to be on cov-
erage itself, with what seems to be an accelerating attempt to widen the scope 
of First Amendment coverage to include actions and events traditionally 
thought to be far removed from any plausible conception of the purposes of 
a principle of free speech.38   
The robust approach to the First Amendment’s protections has come at a 
cost to government regulation.  Indeed, in one recent decision Justice Kennedy 
made an enigmatic reference to the Court’s long-repudiated Lochner decision that 
appeared to suggest that some Justices view the First Amendment as an appro-
priate tool to strike down economic regulations, much as Justices in an earlier 
era used substantive due process and freedom of contract to do the same.39   
It is also helpful to recognize that the argument that the government can-
not force someone to subsidize speech with which she disagrees has developed 
out of two lines of First Amendment jurisprudence, both of which involved 
categories of traditionally-protected speech.  First, for more than seventy years 
the Court has held that the government cannot compel one to profess partic-
ular beliefs.40  It articulated this conclusion in its rulings on two challenges 
brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses more than thirty years apart to laws that went 
to core political speech—one requiring individuals to recite the Pledge of Al-
legiance and another requiring the display of the state motto on all license 
plates.41  In the latter case, the Court wrote that “[a] system which secures the 
right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guar-
antee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.  The right to 
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components 
of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”42   
A conceptually different problem presented itself when a law did not re-
strict or compel speech itself, but rather an activity with expressive content.  
The Court recognized that such activity—whether burning a draft card or 
contributing to a candidate—could raise First Amendment issues, but found 
 
 38 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1613, 1614–15 (2015) (listing dozens of recent cases in which the First Amendment has been used 
to challenge or to defend against a law of general application). 
 39 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567 (“The Constitution ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’  
It does enact the First Amendment.” (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
 40 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding a law requiring recitation 
of the Pledge of Allegiance violates the First Amendment), overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 41 Id. at 627–29; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706–07, 713 (1977) (holding a law requiring New 
Hampshire state license plates to display the logo “Live Free or Die” violates the First Amendment). 
 42 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
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that the restriction functioned at a level of remove that made the constitu-
tional harm less acute.43  In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, the Court applied a 
less strict standard of review to campaign contribution limits than it applied 
to restrictions on the amount a campaign could spend on actual speech.44  It 
reasoned that contributions added little more than volume to the existing 
marketplace of ideas: 
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and 
his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the sup-
port. . . . A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candi-
date or campaign organization . . . involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced 
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom 
to discuss candidates and issues. . . . [T]he transformation of contributions into 
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.45 
Finally, it is helpful at the outset to ask what our constitutional concerns 
are—if any—when we consider Sam’s plight in the Paycheck Problem.  This 
in turn requires us to consider the purpose of the First Amendment and the 
nature of its protections.  Justice Brandeis long ago wrote that the First 
Amendment’s role is to safeguard the “functions essential to effective democ-
racy,” and nearly a century of scholarship has been dedicated to unpacking 
what that might mean and how it should look in application.46  Courts and 
scholars have suggested at least three possible approaches, all of which ap-
pear at various points in Supreme Court opinions yet are not entirely com-
plementary.  The first is that we are concerned with how the compelled fund-
ing of speech affects the oft-cited “marketplace of ideas,” the sausage factory 
 
 43 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding a law banning the destruc-
tion of draft cards and explaining that “a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest”). 
 44 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated 
with such conduct as destruction of a draft card.  Some forms of communication made possible by 
the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some 
involve a combination of the two.  Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or 
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”). 
 45 Id. at 21. 
 46 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  See generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. 
POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin Baker, The 
Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981); Robert H. 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Owen M. Fiss, Free 
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 
(2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010). 
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of democracy in which philosophies are debated, elections are decided, and 
policy judgments are made.47  The focus here is on preserving content, both 
the speaker’s ability to utter it and the listener’s ability to hear it, on the as-
sumption that the best ideas will compete for a Darwinian victory in the pub-
lic (and public policy) arena.48  A second approach suggests that we should 
be concerned whenever the state’s power is brought to bear to infringe an 
individual’s autonomy, or one’s freedom to believe or say what one wishes.49  
The focus here is on ensuring that government does not force a person to 
betray or offend her conscience or sense of self, on the assumption that the 
“constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true 
value . . . ‘individual self-realization.’”50  A third approach argues that stat-
utes and regulations should be evaluated according to the First Amendment’s 
purpose, which is to advance what Robert Post recently described as “dem-
ocratic legitimation” and “public discourse.”51  The focus here is on process, 
both in supporting democratic institutions and encouraging broad and 
 
 47 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–30 (2000) (holding that a university may 
charge students a fee to provide “viewpoint neutral” funding to student groups because the “sole 
purpose of [the program is to] facilitat[e] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its 
students.” ); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (protecting speech in the form 
of paid advertisements because any other conclusion “might shut off an important outlet for the 
promulgation of information and ideas”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas”); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech 
Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011). 
 48 See Volokh, supra note 47, at 596 (arguing that the “marketplace of ideas” is self-regulating because 
thinking people “are constantly engaging in a process through which truth and falsehood are sepa-
rated”).  Scholars have long disputed the aptness of this metaphor, and recent findings in the fields 
of behavioral economics and social psychology have raised questions about its empirical underpin-
nings.  See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984); 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 799 (2010); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010). 
 49 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 46, at 593 (arguing that the First Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to make life-affecting decisions); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 575–
76 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that a subsidy for government speech 
deprives taxpayers of their “presumptive autonomy as speakers”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705, 715 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring citizens to display the state motto on their 
license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (overturning a law 
requiring recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance because it violated the First Amendment). 
 50 Redish, supra note 46, at 593; cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring for-profit corporations, notwithstanding their 
owners’ religious beliefs, to provide contraceptive health care to employees ); Hurley v. Irish-Amer-
ican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental 
rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”). 
 51 See POST, supra note 46, at 73; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 34–51 (arguing that government 
regulation of the “marketplace of ideas” is necessary to ensure opportunity of free expression to all); 
Fiss, supra note 46, at 1416 (“When the state acts to enhance the quality of public debate, we should 
recognize its actions as consistent with the first amendment.”). 
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meaningful participation in public debate.  This theory contemplates that 
social, economic, and cultural forces at work in modern America can create 
circumstances in which the quantity and quality of public debate might, in 
fact, “be enriched and our capacity for collective self-determination en-
hanced” by government regulation of speech.52 
Our intuitions around these background principles may steer us in one di-
rection when a regulation threatens to restrict or ban speech in its entirety—
there, the potential threat to the marketplace of ideas may appear most press-
ing—and another when a regulation compels speech or, as in the Paycheck 
Problem, the subsidy of speech.  There, the potential threat to our individual 
liberty and our right to be free of undue government influence may be our most 
available response.  Certainly both of these ideas inform the cases discussed be-
low.  The question for the reader is whether these, or other, theories provide 
grounds for distinguishing among the payments in the Paycheck Problem. 
B.  Federal Taxes 
1.  Early Cases 
When it comes to his indignation at subsidizing the federal government’s 
speech, Sam is in good company.  Refusal to pay taxes as a form a civil dis-
obedience is embedded in the formative fabric of the United States, and con-
science objections to taxes were argued to—and rejected by—courts long 
before the Supreme Court began to engage seriously with the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause.53  In the latter half of the twentieth century, free 
speech arguments joined other causes of action claimed by tax resisters in 
defending their non-payments.  Taxpayers who objected to various govern-
ment activities—for example, the Vietnam War,54 the Cold War,55 or federal 
welfare programs56—sought to withhold all or a percentage of their taxes, 
resulting in a “flood of ‘tax protest’ actions which threaten[ed] to drown the 
federal court system.”57   
 
 52 Fiss, supra note 46, at 1415. 
 53 See Barnes v. First Par. in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (1 Tyng) 401, 407 (Mass. 1810) (upholding tax to 
support Protestant clergymen over objection that it interfered with “liberty of conscience”); cf. 
Henry David Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government, in THE WRITINGS OF HENRY D. THOREAU: 
REFORM PAPERS 63, 78–84 (Wendell Glick ed., 1973).  See generally WE WON’T PAY!: A TAX 
RESISTANCE READER (David M. Gross ed., 2008); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country: 
Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 946–82. 
 54 United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 55 Welch v. United States, 750 F.2d 1101, 1103 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 56 Crowe v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). 
 57 Fink v. United States, No. 84-109-D, 1984 WL 3062, at *1 (D.N.H. July 10, 1984).  For example, 
the various taxpayers in Welch withheld as a “war tax credit” 52%, representing the percentage of 
the U.S. budget spent on the military, 61% for “government war crimes,” and 50% in protest of 
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It was as a free exercise claim that tax protests reached the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Lee.58  Mr. Lee was an Amish employer who objected 
on religious grounds to making payments into the Social Security system on 
behalf of his employees.59   The Court accepted that payment of the tax vio-
lated Mr. Lee’s religious beliefs.60  (In fact, self-employed members of certain 
religious faiths, including the Amish, were and continue to be exempted from 
the requirement that they pay Social Security taxes for themselves on the 
condition that, among other things, they claim no benefit from the pro-
gram.61)  A unanimous Court found, however, that the government’s legiti-
mate interest in the Social Security program justified the blanket imposition 
of the tax on all employers, regardless of their religious belief. 
Although concerning only a challenge to Social Security taxes and consid-
ering only a free exercise argument, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lee was 
written expansively, observing that there is “broad public interest in maintain-
ing a sound tax system,” and that the system can only be maintained through 
“mandatory and continuous participation.”62  This language was subsequently 
cited by lower courts in tax challenges brought under the Free Speech 
Clause,63 and indeed in his opinion in Lee, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged 
the war tax cases occupying the lower courts, writing that the Court’s holding 
would equally apply to challenges to general federal income taxes.64 
Lee is discussed further below.65  For now, it is worth noting that while 
courts have rejected tax protest arguments since the nation’s founding, until 
recently they did so through application of “traditional” First Amendment 
analysis, weighing the asserted burden against the government interest.66 
 
the nuclear arms race, from their self-assessed taxes in 1982.  Welch, 750 F.2d at 1103. 
 58 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 59 Id. at 254–55. 
 60 Id. at 257. 
 61 Id. at 260–61; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2016). 
 62 Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59, 260. 
 63 See, e.g., Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1985); Welch v. United States, 750 
F.2d 1101, 1109 (1st Cir. 1985); Drefchinski v. Regan, 589 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D. La. 1984); 
Franklet v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 761 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 
1985).  
 64 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (“If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain 
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individ-
uals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income 
tax.  The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system 
because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”). 
 65 See infra notes 295–306 and accompanying text. 
 66 See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59 (weighing government interest in “mandatory and continuous tax-
ation” against the burden on Lee’s religious exercise). 
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2.  Government Speech 
This analysis has changed with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the 
government speech doctrine—the notion that the government does not have 
to maintain viewpoint neutrality when it speaks for itself—to compelled sub-
sidy challenges.67  Of particular relevance to the Paycheck Problem are a trio 
of cases in which the Supreme Court treated similar challenges to similar 
collective funding programs quite differently.   
The first of the three cases, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, asked the 
Court to judge the constitutionality of a mandatory assessment levied on Cal-
ifornia growers to fund generic advertising promoting California stone fruits.68  
In upholding the scheme, the Court explained that its previous compelled 
speech jurisprudence was inapplicable because the assessments were at best 
an indirect burden; they did not “require respondents to repeat an objection-
able message out of their own mouths, use their own property to convey an 
antagonistic ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile message 
when they would prefer to remain silent, or require them to be publicly iden-
tified or associated with another’s message.”69  As for a compelled subsidy of 
speech claim, the Court observed that the farmers’ objection was not rooted 
in politics or conscience but merely in a belief that “their money is not being 
well spent,” which was not a First Amendment complaint.70  The collective 
marketing program did not “warrant special First Amendment scrutiny” un-
der even the less strict standard that applied to commercial speech because it 
was predominantly an economic regulation.71  The majority admonished the 
lower court, which had reached the opposite conclusion, that it ought not 
substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.72   
 
 67 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (“The Government can, without violating the 
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public 
interest, without at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the prob-
lem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; 
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”).  
 68 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 460 (1997). 
 69 Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 70 Id. at 472–73 (“The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being well spent ‘does not 
mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint.’ . . . [O]ur cases provide affirmative support 
for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to 
pay for speech over the objection of some members of the group.” (quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 
U.S. 435, 456 (1984))). 
 71 Id. at 474 (“Respondents’ criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that fac-
tually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody’s right to speak freely.  Similar 
criticisms might be directed at other features of the regulatory orders that impose restraints on 
competition that arguably disadvantage particular producers for the benefit of the entire market.”). 
 72 Id. at 476 (“[D]oubts concerning the policy judgments that underlie many features of this legislation 
do not . . . justify reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations.”). 
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Just four years later in United States v. United Foods, the Court reversed 
course in a case that appeared substantially similar: commercial mushroom 
growers objected to a mandatory assessment for generic mushroom advertis-
ing.73  Taking a different tack than it had in Glickman, a different majority of 
the Court explained that “First Amendment concerns apply . . . because of 
the requirement that producers subsidize speech with which they disagree” 
and held that the compelled subsidies were unconstitutional.74  Although the 
majority suggested that it was applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, it 
cited opinions critical of lower levels of scrutiny for commercial speech with-
out deciding the issue.75  The mushroom assessment was different from the 
tree fruit assessment in Glickman, the majority explained, because “it is only 
the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for 
speech in the first place,” and here there was no associational purpose be-
yond the advertising itself.76  The assessment was not ancillary to a larger 
scheme of economic regulation; it was the scheme.77   
Notwithstanding this narrow distinction, the majority’s language in United 
Foods swept broadly.  “First Amendment values are at serious risk if the gov-
ernment can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to 
pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors,” Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the majority.78  Justice Breyer’s dissent offered the first of many 
critiques of the scope of this language: 
Nearly every human action that the law affects, and virtually all govern-
mental activity, involves speech. . . . Were the Court . . . to apply the strict-
est level of scrutiny in every area of speech touched by law . . . it would, at a 
minimum, create through its First Amendment analysis a serious obstacle to 
the operation of well-established, legislatively created, regulatory programs, 
thereby seriously hindering the operation of that democratic self-govern-
ment that the Constitution seeks to create and to protect.79 
 
 73 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001). 
 74 Id. at 410–11. 
 75 Id. at 409–10. 
 76 Id. at 413.  The dissent argued that this logic created an “unreasoned distinction between heavily 
regulated and less heavily regulated speakers.”  Id. at 428 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 77 Id. at 415–16 (majority opinion) (“[T]he expression respondent is required to support is not ger-
mane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself”). 
 78 Id. at 411. 
 79 Id. at 424–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right 
Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2005) (criticizing the decision’s 
“unprincipled character”); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech 
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 Val. U.L. Rev. 555, 557 
(2006) (criticizing United Foods as having “fundamentally altered received First Amendment doc-
trine” in ways that are “novel” and “seriously misguided”). 
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As the dissent anticipated, in the immediate aftermath of United Foods the 
case was cited in a “cascade” of lawsuits challenging economic coopera-
tives.80  Commentators suggested these would be the tip of the iceberg, noting 
that the implications of United Foods “were breathtaking, suggesting that every 
time tax dollars were used to support government speech, persons who ob-
jected to their use could challenge it on free speech grounds.”81  Against these 
new lawsuits the government introduced an argument that it had raised too 
late in United Foods: that the compelled subsidies were permissible because 
they were funding government speech. 
In one of these cases, cattle ranchers objected to funding the Department 
of Agriculture’s “Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner” campaign.82  Relying on United 
Foods, the Eighth Circuit ruled for the ranchers, finding that the government 
speech doctrine (the government’s new argument) only protected the govern-
ment from charges of viewpoint discrimination, not compelled funding argu-
ments.83  The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari and reversed, ex-
plaining in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association that it had presumed in 
United Foods that the compelled subsidy there was supporting private speech.84  
By contrast, “[c]ompelled support of government—even those programs of 
government one does not approve—is of course perfectly constitutional, as 
every taxpayer must attest.”85   
Much of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Johanns was concerned with 
describing how the beef check-off program and advertisements—which were 
attributed simply to “America’s Beef Producers”—were government speech.86  
This was the contention over which the Court split.  In dissent, Justice Souter, 
joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, did not dispute the premise that the 
First Amendment was implicated by the assessment program, nor that one 
could be compelled to fund government speech (although he recognized that 
 
 80 Post, supra note 29, at 196. 
 81 G. Edward White, The Evolution of First Amendment Protection for Compelled Commercial Speech, 29 J.L. & 
POL. 481, 496–97 (2014); see also Post, supra note 79, at 557. 
 82 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005) (plurality opinion).  
 83 Livestock Mktg. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 717, 722, 725–26 (8th Cir. 2003), 
vacated sub nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, without violating the Constitu-
tion, selectively fund a program to encourage which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.  
In doing so, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen 
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.  ‘[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that right.’” (quoting Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))). 
 84 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 558. 
 85 Id. at 559. 
 86 Id. at 555, 560–65.  Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, while concurring in the judgment because the 
program was a form of permissible economic regulation, expressed skepticism that the speech could 
be properly deemed “government speech.”  See id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 569–70 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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the government speech doctrine was still “new and . . . imprecise”).87  How-
ever, he disagreed that the government speech doctrine applied in the present 
case.  He reasoned that compelled subsidization of government speech is “tol-
erable” because, in part, of the “adequacy of the democratic process.”88  But 
this process could not safeguard the ranchers’ rights when the beef advertise-
ments did not identify the government as speaker.89   
What is most notable for purposes of the Paycheck Problem is that unlike 
the Glickman decision less than a decade earlier, both the plurality and primary 
dissent in Johanns understood the ranchers to state a viable First Amendment 
claim; they just disagreed as to whether the speech at issue qualified as gov-
ernment speech.90  The Court also declined to take the opportunity to over-
rule United Foods, leaving intact its prior holding that even where commercial 
speech is at issue, “using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of 
persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced,” to fund private 
speech violates the First Amendment.91  As discussed below, both of these ob-
servations have implications for Sam’s situation beyond the tax context. 
It is rather remarkable—and perhaps a sign of the growing ambitions of 
litigants regarding the First Amendment’s deregulatory potential—that it 
was not until well into America’s third century that the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a categorical exception barring free speech compelled subsidy chal-
lenges to taxes.  (The Court, it should be noted, has taken a different ap-
proach to religious-based challenges to special assessment schemes.92)  For 
 
 87 Id. at 574–75 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id at 575. 
 89 Id. at 577–78. 
 90 Compare id. at 565 n.8 (plurality opinion) (recognizing the argument that “being forced to fund some-
one else’s private speech unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal au-
tonomy,” but disagreeing as to whether there was a legitimate government interest), with id. at 575–
76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the relative palatability of a remote subsidy shared by every 
taxpayer is not to be found when the speech is funded with targeted taxes.  For then, as here, the 
particular interests of those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression, and 
taxpayers who disagree with it suffer a more acute limitation on their presumptive autonomy as 
speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to say”). 
 91 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 4010 (2001). 
 92 For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores the Court permitted closely-held private companies to 
opt out of the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) contraception coverage mandate, finding that the 
mandate was not the “least restrictive means” for the government to achieve its purpose.  134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (uphold-
ing the individual mandate of the ACA as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power).  The 
challenge was brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-1 (2012), not the Constitution, and government speech was not at issue.  Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2782.  The majority distinguished Lee because “[r]ecognizing a religious accommodation 
under RFRA for particular coverage requirements . . . does not threaten the viability of ACA’s 
comprehensive scheme in the way that recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures 
from general tax revenues would.”  Id. at 2783–84.  This may misread Lee, which was in fact an 
objection to a targeted assessment and expenditure, and in a context in which Congress had already 
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Sam’s purposes, Johanns would seem to resolve at least one of the questions 
presented in the Paycheck Problem, albeit in a manner that does not resolve 
the larger question because it provides limited guidance on the contours of 
the government speech doctrine or its justifications. 
C.  Union Agency Fees 
1.  Early Cases 
Our analysis of Sam’s challenge to his union agency fee begins with Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education.93  Abood was the last in a trio of cases between 1956 
and 1977 that set the contours for federal and state labor laws.94  Under 
them, once a group of employees votes to unionize, a single union is empow-
ered to serve as their exclusive representative, and the employer is bound to 
negotiate with the union in good faith.95  In exchange, unions are required 
to represent all covered employees—members and nonmembers—equally in 
collective bargaining and related contract administration, they are limited in 
their ability to picket, and they must comply with detailed reporting and ac-
counting requirements.96  Unions cannot require a worker to become a full 
card-carrying member or support all union activities.97  They can, however, 
charge all employees they represent an “agency” or “fair share” fee of “peri-
 
provided an opt-out option for individuals with similar objections to Mr. Lee, but that is an issue 
for another day.  See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261–63 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(arguing that granting an exemption for Amish people would not threaten the Social Security tax 
scheme as the majority suggested, but nonetheless agreeing “that there is virtually no room for a 
‘constitutionally required exemption’ on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neu-
tral in its general application” (quoting id. at 256 (majority opinion))).  Of more interest to the pre-
sent inquiry was the Court’s explanation that “protecting the free-exercise rights of corpora-
tions . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies,” Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768, thus suggesting that in some circumstances the Court views the constitu-
tional rights of corporations as emanating from the rights of its individual shareholders. 
 93 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 94 See id.; see also National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); Railway 
Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 
(1961); Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
 95 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 220–21 (describing the benefits and burdens that federal law assigns to a 
designated union); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 159 (2012) (requiring employer to bargain with em-
ployee representatives and providing that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes 
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . .”); Cynthia 
Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 196–99 (2015) (noting that an 
employer’s duty to bargain exclusively with certain employee representatives in good faith “is an 
extraordinary departure from the background principle of freedom of contract”). 
 96 See Estlund, supra note 95, at 199–204. 
 97 Id. at 181–83. 
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odic dues, initiation fees, and assessments” to cover the costs of union ser-
vices.98  While the federal laws prevent states from banning unions, they have 
been interpreted to permit states to bar the imposition of these fair share or 
agency fees, and to date twenty-eight states have passed such statutes.99 
In the first of the cases leading to Abood, Railway Employees’ Department v. 
Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld a law permitting mandatory agency fees 
against several constitutional challenges, including a First Amendment argu-
ment brought by dissenting employees who had voted against unionization 
and did not want to pay the agency fee.100  The Court recognized that the 
mandatory assessment provision of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) was con-
troversial, but it reasoned that so long as its imposition was “relevant or ap-
propriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises,” the wisdom 
of the decision “is one of policy with which the judiciary has no concern.”101  
Congress was allowed to impose the agency fee because “[i]ndustrial peace 
along the arteries of commerce is a legitimate objective.”102   
The Hanson Court specifically reserved judgment on situations in which 
the dues, fees, or assessments were wielded as fines or penalties, or situations 
in which they served as “cover for forcing ideological conformity or other 
action in contravention of the First Amendment.”103  The latter question 
came back to the Court five years later in International Association of Machinists 
v. Street,104 a case in which the employees built a substantial record that a 
portion of their union payments were being used to support political causes 
and candidates with which they disagreed.105  In evaluating whether the chal-
lenged “union shop” provision of the RLA could be construed in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution, the Court looked at the legislative history 
discussing the authorization of the mandatory fees.  Union representatives 
 
 98 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012); see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (“[N]o conditions to membership may be 
imposed except as respects ‘periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.’” (quoting 45 U.S.C. 
§ 152 (2012))); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting unions from causing discriminatory treat-
ment of an employee whose membership has been denied “on some ground other than his failure 
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership”). 
 99 See Estlund, supra note 95, at 181 n.57; Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. 
FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2017); see also Sweeney v. Pence, 767 
F.3d 654, 657, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding as constitutional Indiana’s Right to Work law, which 
prevented individuals from being required to pay fair share fees); id. at 683 (Wood, J., dissenting) 
(offering an alternative reading of the relevant statutory provisions). 
 100 Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.   
 101 Id. at 234. 
 102 Id. at 233.   
 103 Id. at 238 (“On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amend-
ment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member 
of an integrated bar.”). 
 104 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 105 Id. at 747–48. 
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had argued to Congress that because the law tasked the union with consid-
erable—and costly—responsibilities, including collective bargaining and 
handling employee grievances, the law would create a “free rider” problem 
if it lacked a mechanism to require everyone to pay their fair share of these 
expenses.106  The Court upheld the imposition of agency fees for these rea-
sons; however, it found no evidence that Congress intended that the manda-
tory fees permit unions to force employees, “over their objection, to support 
political causes which they oppose.”107  The union was free to make political 
expenditures, but not with the money of objecting union-shop employees, 
who needed only pay a lower agency fee for covered services.108 
In so construing the statute, the Street Court avoided the constitutional 
question.  It also avoided passing judgment on expenses that fell into the grey 
area “between the costs which led directly to the complaint as to ‘free riders,’ 
and the expenditures to support union political activities.”109  Both of these 
issues were presented in Abood.  Detroit public school teachers in a recently 
unionized workplace sought to overturn a state law that mirrored federal la-
bor laws in substantial respects, including the grant of exclusive representa-
tion to unions and their duty of fair representation for all covered employ-
ees.110  The Michigan law, however, explicitly allowed the union to spend its 
agency fees on “legislative lobbying and in support of political candidates.”111  
Both the mandatory fee and its use for political purposes were challenged.112 
The Abood Court answered the two questions quite differently.  As to the 
mandatory agency fee, the Court agreed that petitioners raised a valid First 
Amendment objection, but found that the resolution of the question was an-
swered by Hanson, which sustained agency fees against a First Amendment 
challenge, and Street, which read the RLA to bar the use of nonmember fees 
for unrelated ideological or political purposes.113  While the Court acknowl-
edged that differences between public- and private-sector workplaces existed 
 
 106 Id. at 761. 
 107 Id. at 764; see also id. at 767–68 (“Congress . . . was made fully aware that it was deciding these 
critical issues of individual right versus collective interests . . . . Indeed, Congress gave very concrete 
evidence that it carefully considered the claims of the individual to be free of arbitrary or unreason-
able restrictions resulting from compulsory unionism.  It did not give a blanket approval to union-
shop agreements.  Instead it enacted a precise and carefully drawn limitation on the kind of union-
shop agreements which might be made.  The obvious purpose of this careful prescription was to 
strike a balance between the interests pressed by the unions and the considerations which the Car-
riers have urged.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 108 Id. at 770. 
 109 Id. at 769–70. 
 110 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1977). 
 111 Id. at 215. 
 112 Id. at 212–13. 
 113 Id. at 226–32. 
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and might bear on policy judgments regarding the decision to authorize pub-
lic-sector unions, it rejected the contention that the public/private sector dis-
tinction meaningfully altered the constitutional burden the agency fee imposed 
on an individual employee.114  The Michigan law did not limit any employee’s 
ability to express her views about issues subject to the collective bargaining 
agreement, the Court noted, and employees in the private sector might also 
object to “a variety of union activities [that] conflict with their beliefs.”115  Pe-
titioners’ emphasis on public-sector employment as being inherently political 
was misplaced in this context, the Court explained.  First, “[n]othing in the 
First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question 
whether the adjective ‘political’ can properly be attached to those beliefs the 
critical constitutional inquiry.”116  Second, the Court’s previous cases had al-
ready assumed that the agency fees imposed a significant First Amendment 
burden.  The fee could be assessed not because it did not impact speech rights, 
but because even in light of that impact it was a reasonable legislative solution 
to a significant issue that was within Congress’s power to regulate.117 
As to the question of how the union could spend the money collected via 
mandatory fees, the Court overturned the state law insofar as it permitted 
agency fees to be used for “political and ideological purposes unrelated to 
collective bargaining.”118  In doing so, it employed soaring and oft-quoted 
rhetoric to declare that 
at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should 
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.  
And the freedom of belief is no incidental or secondary aspect of the First 
Amendment’s protections.119   
 
 114 Id. at 232 (“The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not 
translate into differences in First Amendment rights.”). 
 115 Id. at 230 (“The very real differences between exclusive-agent collective bargaining in the public 
and private sectors are not such as to work any greater infringement upon the First Amendment 
interests of public employees.”); id. at 231–32 (“[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression 
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive 
list of labels—is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.  Union members in both the public 
and private sectors may find that a variety of union activities conflict with their beliefs.”).  Just a 
year before, the Court had held that even commercial speech was due some level of constitutional 
protection.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976). 
 116 Abood, 431 U.S. at 232. 
 117 Id. at 219. 
 118 Id. at 232. 
 119 Id. at 234–35 (citations omitted).  The Court quoted from both West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, a compelled speech decision, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23, a 
money-for-speech decision, in this section of its opinion, ignoring any distinction between a direct 
and indirect imposition of a speech compulsion.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35. 
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The best way to reconcile these apparently discordant descriptions of an 
employee’s First Amendment rights is to recognize the work done by the de-
pendent clause “unrelated to collective bargaining”—which the Court repeats 
several times throughout its opinion120—to focus the First Amendment inquiry 
on whether the union has unduly leveraged its position as exclusive representa-
tive to extract funds that exceed its statutory purpose.121  Whereas the Abood 
litigants had argued that the touchstone of their case rested in the notion of 
whether the speech at issue was “political,” the Court’s ruling instead turned 
on whether it was “related” to the overriding statutory scheme.  So long as the 
funds at issue are being spent on activities intended to benefit employees and 
that the union is required to furnish, an employee can be asked to provide 
them; funds used to benefit the union’s political goals must be voluntary.122   
Until recently, this “related/unrelated” distinction guided the Court’s 
analysis of compelled subsidy claims raised in similar contexts, with com-
pelled fees for provided services held constitutional even if potentially con-
troversial speech were involved, and compelled fees for ideological activity 
not part of the organization’s core mission barred by the First Amend-
ment.123  For example, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, the Court held 
that a union could not use agency fees to fund litigation by a national affiliate 
that did not concern its unit, but it could charge nonmembers for strike prep-
aration in support of its collective bargaining goals.124  Similarly, in Keller v. 
State Bar, the Court applied Abood to hold that state bar associations could 
 
 120 See id. at 215, 232, 236, 241. 
 121 See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 786 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the “imposition of ‘assessments . . . not germane to collective bargaining’ would present ‘a different 
problem’” (quoting Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956))).  
 122 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. 
 123 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); see also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. 
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984) (“[W]hen employees . . . object to being burdened with particular 
union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or rea-
sonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”); cf. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. 
All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2326–27 (2013) (holding that a federal program 
that “compels  as  a  condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot 
be confined within the scope of the Government program” violates the First Amendment); Keller 
v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (noting that a group “may not . . . fund activities of an ideological 
nature” that are “not ‘germane’ to the purpose for which compelled association was justified”).  
Employees with a religious objection to an agency fee are typically allowed by statute to contribute 
the funds they would have paid to a union to a charity of their choice.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 169 
(2012); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.225 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.64.160 (2017). 
 124 Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 528.  If the union had actually engaged in a strike, that would have been illegal 
and not chargeable.  Id. at 531. 
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only extract compulsory fees from attorneys for purposes related to the reg-
ulation and improvement of the profession and not for unrelated ideological 
initiatives, such as lobbying for gun regulations.125   
Given that the union activity to which Sam objects—negotiating for the 
increased use of BWCs—arises within the context of the union’s collective 
bargaining duties, it would seem that he has no viable First Amendment claim 
to opt out of payments.  Or so it would have seemed up until 2012, when the 
Supreme Court began openly questioning the balance struck in Abood. 
2.  Knox and Harris 
Notwithstanding Hanson and its progeny, Sam’s objection to paying his 
union agency fee comes at a time when the Court appears ready to recon-
sider the lines it drew in its earlier union cases.  A shift in the winds—or a 
shaking in the foundation—was signaled in 2012 with Knox v. Service Employees 
Union International, Local 1000.126  The case appeared to present a relatively 
discrete procedural issue—the administration of a mid-year assessment by a 
union for political lobbying—but in his majority opinion against the union, 
Justice Alito spent several paragraphs criticizing Abood in dicta, calling the 
Court’s previous “[a]cceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification 
for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues . . . something of 
an anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in fur-
thering ‘labor peace.’”127  Crucially, the majority opinion also blurred the 
distinction the Court had long observed between speech and financial sup-
port for speech, holding that “the compulsory fees constitute a form of com-
pelled speech,” not mere subsidy of speech.128 
Litigants saw, if not an invitation, certainly an opportunity in Knox’s lan-
guage, and within two years a union agency fee case directly challenging Abood 
was before the Court.  The petitioners in Harris v. Quinn were home health 
aide workers in Illinois who had recently been unionized and objected to the 
imposition of agency fees.129  The majority of the Court, in an opinion again 
written by Justice Alito, upheld their challenge but sidestepped the big ques-
tion, finding that because the employees in question were only “quasi” rather 
than “full” government employees—for example, they were paid by the state 
but hired by individual patients—Abood and its progeny did not apply; the 
 
 125 Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 (finding “a substantial analogy between the relationship of the State Bar and 
its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of employee unions and their members, on the 
other”). 
 126 567 U.S. 298, 309–11 (2012). 
 127 Id. at 311 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986)).  
 128 Id. at 310; see also supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 129 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2014). 
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focus thus was on the nature of the speech restriction itself rather than whether 
the fee supported activities “germane” to collective bargaining.130  Free of the 
force of precedent, the case proceeded under “generally applicable First 
Amendment standards.”131  The Court subjected the fee to “exacting scru-
tiny,”132 asking whether the mandatory agency fee served “a ‘compelling state 
interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restric-
tive of associational freedoms.’”133  In using this test to strike down the agency 
fee, the majority rejected the underlying rationales for Abood, which it seemed 
to leave standing only out of deference to precedent. 
It is telling to look at how the majority in Harris (and, to a large extent, 
Knox) analyzed the First Amendment issues presented.  Both Harris and Knox 
held that the compelled subsidy of speech “presents the same dangers as com-
pelled speech”; there was no difference between being forced to say some-
thing and forced to pay for someone else to say something, even if one’s own 
ability to speak up is unfettered.134  Thus it followed that because the agency 
fees required an employee to support speech on a matter of public concern, 
they placed a severe First Amendment burden on the dissenting workers.135  
If the majority took a broad view of the First Amendment burden, it took 
a narrow view of the government’s countervailing interests.  In a cramped 
reading of history, Justice Alito framed the government’s interest in “labor 
peace” as simply a desire to avoid disputes between unions vying to represent 
employees.136  Because the union in Harris retained its exclusive bargaining 
 
 130 Id. at 2638.  The dissent and commentators have critiqued the majority opinion as seizing on a 
distinction without a difference—or, if it was a meaningful difference, without adequately describ-
ing what unique aspects of the Illinois home health aide scheme merited departure from Abood.  Id. 
at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito did take the opportunity to criticize Hanson and Abood 
in dicta as, variously, “thin,” “unsupported,” and “questionable.”  Id. at 2621, 2629, 2632 (majority 
opinion).  Street was dismissed because “[it] was not a constitutional decision.”  Id. at 2621. 
 131 Id. at 2639. 
 132 Id. at 2639 (“[A]n agency-fee provision imposes ‘a significant impingement on First Amendment 
rights,’ and this cannot be tolerated unless it passes ‘exacting First Amendment scrutiny.’” (quoting 
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012))). 
 133 Id. at 2639 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 310). 
 134 Id.; Knox, 567 U.S. at 309–11, 313–14.  Justice Alito doubled down on this reading in the recent 
Janus v. AFSCME oral argument, comparing union nonmembers to Thomas Moore in A Man for All 
Seasons, and asking: “When you compel somebody to speak, don’t you infringe that person’s dignity 
and conscience in a way that you do not when you restrict what the person says?”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 38–45, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. (“AFSCME”), Council 
31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Highland Films 1966); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–7, Janus supra (reflecting that Petitioner’s counsel framed an 
agency fee as compelled speech, not compelled subsidization). 
 135 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 136 Id. at 2631; see Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists 
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750–63 (1961) (giving a history of labor negotiations).  Attempting to swing 
an existing union is in fact already barred by NLRB rules.   
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status, he explained that this interest was irrelevant.137  As for the govern-
ment’s interest in everyone paying their “fair share,” Justice Alito only men-
tioned this concern in passing, relying on his statement in Knox to dismiss 
“free-rider arguments . . . [as] generally insufficient to overcome First 
Amendment objections” without further discussion.138  To reconstruct, then, 
the Court’s argument between Knox and Harris: the free-rider argument is 
only relevant as it pertains to furthering labor peace; labor peace is only 
about inter-union rivalries; thanks to exclusive representation provisions,  
there is no risk of inter-union rivalries; thus, there is no need to be concerned 
for labor peace; ergo: free-rider arguments are no longer compelling.139  
This, of course, reads out any possibility that preventing free-riding might 
promote labor peace—the proposition from which Knox had started—in 
ways unrelated to inter-union rivalries (for example, reducing workplace ten-
sions between members and nonmembers), or that it might serve other im-
portant purposes, such as avoiding the constitutionally problematic scenario 
of requiring unions to provide services to those who refuse to pay for them.140 
The Harris majority also significantly restated the test to determine if the 
government’s interests could be met by “means significantly less restrictive” 
than the mandatory agency fee.  The union argued that all home health care 
workers had received significant benefits due to union representation and thus, 
it was implied, should equally bear the costs of representation.141  Justice Alito 
explained that this showing was insufficient.142  The fair share mandate could 
only be sustained if “the cited benefits for personal assistants could not have 
been achieved if the union had been required to depend for funding on the 
dues paid by those personal assistants who chose to join.”143  It was not enough 
to show that the loss of the funds would hurt the union; the loss must be fatal 
 
 137 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (2012) (establishing that it would be an 
unfair labor practice for a union to “forc[e] or requir[e] any employer to recognize or bargain with 
a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization 
has been certified as the representative of such employees . . . .”). 
 138 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 311).  As for the fact that the union’s privileges 
as an exclusive agent came with the responsibility to represent all employees equally, whether or 
not they were union members, the majority reasoned that this burden was of little import because 
Illinois law already constrained many of the terms on which the union could bargain.  Id. at 2640. 
 139 See Knox, 567 U.S. at 311 (“[T]he free-rider argument [is] . . . one that we have found to be justified 
by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’” (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 
475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986))); Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 140 See infra note 303. 
 141 Harris, 134. S. Ct. at 2640–41. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 2641; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (No. 14-915) (“Abood never said, and no case since Abood has ever said, 
that agency fees are necessary to union survival.  Abood couldn’t have said that, because when Abood 
ruled as it did, Taft­Hartley had been on the books for decades.”).  
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to it.  The majority, which introduced this reformulated test with no citation, 
seemed to put the burden for proving this counterfactual on the union.144 
Four Justices dissented in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan.145  
Among other points, she revisited the question of whether the government 
had shown a compelling interest justifying the fee.  Justice Kagan argued that 
the majority had fundamentally misunderstood (or ignored) the argument 
advanced by the state and union.  The “free rider” justification was not (only) 
about the fairness of nonunion members receiving some ancillary “spillover” 
benefit from the union’s activities, but about the fact that the union was le-
gally bound to represent the nonmembers and could not discriminate against 
them in its negotiations.146  Justice Kagan quoted at length from an earlier 
opinion by Justice Scalia upholding agency fees:   
The “compelling state interest” that justifies this constitutional rule is not 
simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union ac-
tivity redounds to the benefit of “free-riding” nonmembers; private speech 
often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower 
the state to compel the speech to be paid for.  What is distinctive, however, 
about the “free riders” [in unions] . . . is that . . . the law requires the union to 
carry [free riders]—indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit 
[them], even at the expense of its other interests. . . . [T]he free ridership (if 
it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed 
by circumstances but mandated by government decree.147 
The Harris majority, which included Justice Scalia, did not address this 
argument.148 
Justice Scalia’s forceful earlier opinion justifying agency fees and his failure 
to write separately in Knox and Harris did not go unremarked by commenta-
tors.  “The silence of the normally voluble Justice Scalia is both aberrant and 
enigmatic,” William Gould observed in a review of the 2014 Supreme Court 
term.149  He noted that a majority of the Court appeared poised to overrule 
Abood squarely if presented with the right case, and he flagged a recent Ninth 
Circuit decision that might provide just such a vehicle, Friedrichs v. California 
 
 144 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2641 (“[A] majority of the personal assistants voted to unionize.  When they 
did so, they must have realized that this would require the payment of union dues, and therefore it 
may be presumed that a high percentage of these personal assistants became union members and 
are willingly paying union dues.  Why are these dues insufficient . . . ?”). 
 145 Id. at 2644 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
 146 Id. at 2656.  
 147 Id. at 2657 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)). 
 148 While not in direct response to the dissent, the majority opinion did note that the health care union’s 
“scope of bargaining” was “sharply limited” by statute, presumably implying that the services pro-
vided were not significant, but this goes only to the amount charged, not the underlying principle.  
Id. at 2635 (majority opinion).   
 149 William B. Gould IV, Organized Labor, the Supreme Court, and Harris v. Quinn: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 157 (2014). 
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Teachers Association.150  “The good news is that Justice Scalia . . . could still tip 
the delicate balance,” Professor Gould wrote.  Then again, he added wryly, 
“The bad news is that Justice Scalia could tip the balance.”151 
3.  Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association 
We know now that Justice Scalia would have tipped the balance, although 
we may never know for sure which way.152  Rebecca Friedrichs was a veteran 
California public school teacher who objected to many of the policy positions 
advocated by her union and challenged the mandatory agency fee in court.153  
Her eponymous lawsuit was rushed through the lower courts by groups long 
opposed to unions, but it arrived at the Supreme Court just a bit too late.154  
The case was argued on January 11, 2016.155  Barely a month later, on Febru-
ary 13, Justice Scalia passed away suddenly, and Friedrichs became the first sig-
nificant case to be summarily affirmed by a 4-4 vote in the 2015–2016 term.156   
For observers, Friedrichs presented a rare opportunity of extended equipoise, 
the legal equivalent of an insect frozen in amber.  More than fifty briefs were 
filed either in support of or in opposition to the questions presented, which 
asked the Court, first, whether Abood should be overruled, and second, whether 
the First Amendment requires that union membership be determined via opt-
in rather than opt-out clauses.157  The Paycheck Problem is concerned with the 
first question, which consumed the bulk of the briefing and oral argument. 
 
 150 Id. at 160 (citing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 18, 2014), aff’g No. SACV 13–676–JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam)). 
 151 Id. at 173. 
 152 But see Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-
of-donald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html (quoting Justice Ginsburg that “[t]his court couldn’t 
have done better than it did” with the 4-4 result in Friedrichs). 
 153 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 5, 2013), aff’d, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam). 
 154 The petitioners did not even pause to develop a record.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 61–62, 
Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915). 
 155 Id.  
 156 Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083; see Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Result but No Guidance on Public Unions’ 
Fees, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2016, 11:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/opinion-
analysis-result-but-no-guidance-on-public-unions-fees/ (“Tuesday’s result in this key case marked 
the second time that the Court, with its membership reduced by one, had divided evenly in a case it 
had reviewed.  A week ago, it did so in a case about spouses’ responsibility for each others’ debts.” 
(citing Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (per curiam))).  Petitioners’ re-
quest for a new hearing before nine Justices was denied.  Friedrichs v. Cal. Teacher’s Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.). 
 157 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (indicating that 
58 amicus briefs were filed). 
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Petitioners did not attempt to distinguish Abood but challenged it as 
wrongly decided.158  Thus their argument was framed by an effort to distin-
guish Hanson and Street, which involved private-sector unions, from situations 
involving public-sector unions.159  Advancing again the argument the Court 
had rejected nearly forty years earlier, Petitioners contended that virtually all 
terms of public employment were “political” and thus the agency fee should 
be subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.160  To the extent they made 
this argument in an effort to distinguish the private sector cases from Abood, 
they may have proved too little; Abood itself subjected the public teachers’ 
agency fee to “exacting scrutiny.”161  To the extent they made this argument 
to suggest that the previous union cases had underestimated the First Amend-
ment burden the agency fee places on public employees, they may have 
proved too much.  “[C]ompelled subsidization of speech and mandated as-
sociation receive exacting First Amendment scrutiny even in the ‘mundane’ 
contexts of commercial speech and general civic groups,” Petitioners argued 
in their opening brief.162  Given this, one might wonder—as several of the 
Justices did at oral argument—why Petitioners’ argument did not also sweep 
into its ambit private union agreements such as those in Hanson and Street.163   
While Petitioners did acknowledge that their lawsuit presented a compelled 
subsidy rather than a compelled speech challenge, it is not clear that they 
viewed the First Amendment burden in any way attenuated by the fact.164  Cal-
ifornia Teachers Association’s (“CTA”) collective bargaining activities raised 
special First Amendment concerns, Petitioners explained, because they in-
cluded speech that was potentially “politically controversial or inconsistent 
with the beliefs of some teachers,”165 they involved issues of “public concern” 
 
 158 Brief for the Petitioners at 16, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5261564 [herein-
after Friedrichs Pet’r Br.]. 
 159 Id. at 29, 2015 WL 5261564. 
 160 Id. at 20, 2015 WL 5261564; see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) (“Nothing 
in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjec-
tive ‘political’ can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry.”). 
 161 Id. at 259 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 162 Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 18. 
 163 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915).  Petitioner Counsel’s 
explanation that private union agreements are distinguishable because “the First Amendment 
doesn’t apply to private employers, and because in [prior private union cases] the Court established 
the rules for agency shops based on the statute without any First Amendment [analysis]” was met 
by some skepticism by certain members of the Court.  Id. at 6–15; see also supra notes 73–79 (dis-
cussing United Foods). 
 164 See, e.g., Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 10–11. 
 165 Id. at 22. 
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and attempts to “influence governmental policymaking,”166 and they had a fis-
cal impact of the state budget.167  Consider these objections in light of the full 
range of activities that prompt Sam’s concerns in the Paycheck Problem. 
A review of the oral argument transcript suggests that the case may have 
come down to the “narrowly tailored” question, as re-shaped in Harris: could 
the union survive without the mandatory agency fee?  Justice Scalia focused 
on this question during oral argument, and parties disputed which of them 
bore the burden of proof for it.168  In the end, the point was moot as far as 
Friedrichs was concerned.  At the end of its 2016 term, the Court rejected a 
motion for rehearing on the case.169 
The sword suspended over public union agency fees may be about to fall.  
At the start of the October 2017 term, following Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation 
to fill its vacant ninth seat, the Court agreed to hear Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), Council 31.170  The case 
again asks the Court to overrule Abood, and most Court watchers believe that 
this will happen.171 
The briefs filed supporting and opposing the Janus petition for certiorari 
suggest that advocates read the tea leaves in Friedrichs.  For example, signifi-
cant attention is given to the question of whether abolishing the mandatory 
agency fee would significantly harm unions.172  In addition to defending 
Abood’s reasoning, Respondents appear ready to raise again two arguments 
rehearsed in Friedrichs: that the government is held to a less high burden when 
it impacts free speech rights as an employer rather than a sovereign, and that 
the absence of any record below makes the case a poor vehicle for overruling 
a forty-year-old precedent.173  Petitioner too raises similar claims: that unions 
 
 166 Id. at 22–23 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (majority opinion)). 
 167 Id. at 25–26. 
 168 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, 57, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915). 
 169 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teacher’s Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.). 
 170 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Janus v. Am. Fed’n, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.). 
 171 Id.; see also Ross Runkel, Janus v. AFSCME Could End Public Sector “Agency Shop” Agreements, ROSS 
RUNKEL REP. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.rossrunkelreport.com/blog/janus-v-afscme-cert (“I 
don’t know anyone who thinks Abood will survive.”).  The question of whether the Constitution 
demands an opt-in versus an opt-out procedure to determine union membership, the second ques-
tion in Friedrichs, is not presented in Janus.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Rebecca Friedrichs & Freedom 
Found. in Support of Petitioner at 2–4, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466).  
 172 See, e.g, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Buckeye Inst. for Pub. Policy Sols. in Support of Petitioner at 
2–4, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mackinac Ctr. for 
Pub. Policy in Support of Petitioner at 1–3, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466). 
 173 Compare Brief in Opposition for Respondents Lisa Madigan & Michael Hoffman at 6, Janus, 138 S. 
Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466), with Brief for the Union Respondents at 109, Friedrichs, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083 (per curiam) (No. 14-915).  See also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2653 (2014) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (“This Court has long acknowledged that the government has wider constitutional 
latitude when it is acting as employer than as sovereign.”). 
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routinely engage in political activities with agency fees notwithstanding pro-
cedural safeguards established to administer Abood, and that the nature of 
public unions is such that all of their activity is political and therefore one 
cannot be compelled to pay for it.174  As for the “free rider” question, Peti-
tioner disputes the underlying legislative rationale for agency fees, arguing 
that many employees receive no benefit from the union and that the grant of 
exclusive representation provides “advantages [that] far outweigh any minor 
disadvantages that may come with exclusive representative power.”175  These 
preliminary briefs do not address the line articulated in Abood between, on 
the one hand, the nature of a union’s speech in public and private contexts 
and the policy judgments implicated in authorizing unions in the public and 
private sectors (where the Abood Court agreed distinctions could be drawn), 
and, on the other, the nature of the First Amendment burden that agency 
fees impose on public as opposed to private employees (where it found no 
meaningful distinction).176   
The deciding vote on the question of public union agency fees is now on 
the Court.  Widely regarded as an originalist in the mold of Justice Scalia, 
Justice Gorsuch appears to take a robust view of the protections of the First 
Amendment, although he has not yet considered a case that presents the 
agency fee question.177  During his first few months on the Court he has con-
sistently voted with its most conservative members.178  Officer Sam could be 
forgiven for eagerly anticipating the day he can stop paying his agency fee. 
D.  Public Pension Contributions 
A discussion of the law relevant to the pension prong of the Paycheck 
Problem begins with two observations.  First, there are very few cases reported 
in any court in which shareholders have filed a lawsuit based on a company’s 
 
 174 Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–13, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466), 
with Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 9–11. 
 175 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466). 
 176 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). 
 177 See id. at 211; see also Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (noting that Justice 
Gorsuch joined with Justice Thomas to dissent from the Court’s summary affirmance of a lower 
court case upholding contribution limits to political parties), aff’g 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 88–89 (D.D.C. 
2016); Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315, 1316–18 (10th Cir. 2015) (Hartz, J., 
dissenting) (reflecting that Justice Gorsuch joined a dissent that would have found filing a one-page 
form to opt out of contraception coverage an unconstitutional burden of religious liberty), vacated 
sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Ramesh Ponnuru, Neil Gorsuch: A Worthy Heir to 
Scalia, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444437/neil-gorsuch-
antonin-scalia-supreme-court-textualist-originalist-heir. 
 178 See Nina Totenberg, Justice Neil Gorsuch Votes 100 Percent of the Time with Most Conservative Colleague, 
NPR (July 1, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/07/01/535085491/justice-neil-gor-
such-votes-100-percent-of-the-time-with-most-conservative-collea. 
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political spending,179 even fewer where the plaintiffs raised a First Amend-
ment objection to such expenditures,180 and none that either my research as-
sistants or I could locate in which the corporate shareholder (or functional 
equivalent) was victorious.  Second, notwithstanding this fact, the very first 
amicus brief to be filed with the Supreme Court in support of the union’s 
position in Friedrichs was submitted by nineteen prominent corporate law pro-
fessors.181  The brief was filed to disabuse the Court of the assumption it had 
made in previous cases “that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political 
expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate 
spending.”182  It is not difficult to read between the lines of the brief an aware-
ness of the potential of the union cases to unsettle the relationship between 
corporations and shareholders, including pension funds and beneficiaries.183 
To understand this apparent incongruity, it is necessary to understand 
the key role that the concept of “corporate democracy” has assumed in cases 
that involve the constitutionality of corporations using their shareholders’ 
money to make political expenditures.  While the dissenting shareholder has 
played only a bit part in shareholder derivative actions—and for good rea-
son, as discussed below—she has made a regular appearance in the Supreme 
Court’s campaign finance cases.184 
Prior to Citizens United, both corporations and unions were required to use 
segregated accounts (“political action committees” or “PACs”) to make con-
tributions to politicians and to make political independent expenditures.185  
 
 179 See Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (addressing 
whether California state law allowed corporate contribution to a political cause); Barnes v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 88 (1993) (addressing whether insurance company 
could spend premium revenues on political cause that some policyholders opposed); Stern v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing shareholder’s claims that General Elec-
tric’s contributions to its political action committee constituted corporate waste and violation of 
fiduciary duties), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 180 See Barnes, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91–94; see also Marsili, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (refusing to consider 
counterargument by corporation that it had a First Amendment right to make the challenged con-
tribution). 
 181 Brief of Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1–3, Friedrichs v. 
Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915) (per curiam), 2015 WL 7068957 [herein-
after Corporate Law Professors’ Brief]. 
 182 Id. at 4 n.3 (listing cases). 
 183 See, e.g., id. at 6 (“What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a corporate expenditure, whether 
on a particular business strategy or in support of a political position?  The short answer is very 
little.”). 
 184 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–63 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
204 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792–93 (1978). 
 185 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (current version at 52 
U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (2012))).  
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Contributions to PACs are voluntary and subject to contribution limits.186  (In 
addition, unions continue to have significant accounting requirements to en-
sure that nonmembers are not charged for other activities that are not germane 
to the union’s representation.187)  Citizens United, a corporation, produced 
and wanted to distribute a movie attacking Hillary Clinton.188  It argued, inter 
alia, that it should be able to use its general treasury funds to do so.189 
In defense of the PAC requirement, the Government argued that if cor-
porations could use their unlimited general treasury funds to support political 
issues and candidates, they would put corporate investors in the position of 
funding political speech—speech that the Court has long recognized lies at 
the heart of the First Amendment.190  It was not writing on new ground.  
Professor Adam Winkler has argued that a concern about the misuse of 
“other people’s money” significantly advanced and informed early campaign 
finance reform efforts.191  And in several prior cases upholding laws that lim-
ited corporate political speech, the Supreme Court in fact recognized the 
concerns of dissenting shareholders.192  For example, in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, which upheld a state law banning corporations from us-
ing general treasury funds on independent expenditures, Justice Brennan in-
voked the image of a “captive stockholder of a business corporation” in his 
concurrence against the corporate interests.193  He rejected the idea that 
 
 186 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(3) (2012); 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116 (West 2017).   
 187 Chi. Teacher Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306–07, 310 (1986) (“We hold today 
that the constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate 
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of 
the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute 
while such challenges are pending.”); see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1038; Sachs, 
supra note 19, at 861; cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337. 
 188 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21. 
 189 Id. 
 190 See id. at 361 (discussing the Government’s argument “that corporate independent expenditures can 
be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund 
corporate political speech”). 
 191 Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 871, 876 (2004) (“[T]he early emphasis on excessive corporate power was insufficient to lead 
to broad reform; it was only after the ‘other people’s money’ theme supplemented other concerns 
about corporate politics and shifted the focus of public debate that the ban [on corporate political 
contributions] attracted the necessary support.”). 
 192 See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (recognizing that the ban on corporate political 
contributions protected shareholders); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003); Austin v. Mich. 
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (noting that “many of [the Chamber’s] 
members may be . . . reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber's 
political expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to 
establish contacts with other members of the business community”); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986) (describing the importance of persons connected with a corporation 
having “no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity”).  
 193 Austin, 494 U.S. at 674–75 (Brennan, J. concurring); see also id. at 675 (“[T]he State surely has a 
compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not 
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stockholder divestment could provide a remedy because that “would impose 
a financial sacrifice on those objecting to political expenditures.”194   
Justice Kennedy dissented in Austin, and he wrote the majority opinion in 
the case that overruled it.  Citizens United eliminated the PAC requirement for 
everything except direct political contributions.195  Justice Kennedy ex-
plained that PACs did not reasonably accommodate competing interests be-
cause they were “burdensome,” “expensive,” and “subject to extensive reg-
ulations.”196  As for the interests of dissenting shareholders in the face of 
unrestrained corporate political spending, Justice Kennedy reached back to 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, an earlier case in which the Court had 
overturned a state ban on corporate expenditures on political referenda, to 
explain, with little discussion, that shareholders’ interests could be protected 
“through the procedures of corporate democracy.”197   
The reader who perceives a potential conflict between this logic and the 
union cases described above (which nowhere reference union democracy but 
do impose significant accounting responsibilities to segregate political 
funds198) is not alone.  Indeed, Bellotti itself had featured a strenuous dissent 
by Justice White arguing that Abood had already answered the question pre-
sented—individuals could not be forced to subsidize an organization’s polit-
ical speech.199  The majority there rejected the analogy because “[t]he critical 
distinction here is that no shareholder has been ‘compelled’ to contribute 
anything.”200  Justice White in turn observed that the “employees in Street and 
Abood were also free to seek other jobs where they would not be compelled to 
finance causes with which they disagreed, but we held in Abood that First 
Amendment rights could not be so burdened.”201 
In the Paycheck Problem, all of Sam’s payments are required by law, so 
the degree of compulsion does not distinguish one from the other.202  The 
 
wish to contribute to the Chamber’s political message.”). 
 194 Id. at 674. 
 195 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 196 Id. at 337. 
 197 Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)); see also id. at 370–71. 
 198 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 199 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 814–19 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209 (1977)). 
 200 Id. at 794 n.34 (majority opinion). 
 201 Id. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (“Clearly the State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens 
are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and 
passing up investment opportunities.”). 
 202 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2016) (requiring employers to withhold income taxes from all employees); Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding state laws may constitutionally impose the 
withholding of union agency fees); NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, EMPLOYEE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 1 (2017), https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20 
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question remains, however, whether corporate democracy sets compelled 
subsidies of corporations apart from union dues, which brings us back to the 
corporate law professors’ amicus brief in Friedrichs.  A brief review may be 
helpful.  Corporations are, like unions, entities authorized by state law to 
harness and channel the collective resources of stakeholders.203  While tech-
nically the shareholders own the capital and thus the corporation, they have 
virtually no control over the corporation’s day-to-day activities, which is 
vested in managers and officers.204  As with union officers, corporate officers 
owe their stakeholders a fiduciary duty to, inter alia, avoid self-dealing and act 
in good faith.205  Even if this were not a highly deferential standard, it requires 
information to monitor.  This is not the venue for a protracted discussion of 
the requirements, timing, and effectiveness of corporate disclosures, but for 
present purposes suffice it to say that to date the SEC has not mandated dis-
closure of corporate political spending.206  Nor is it likely to do so soon; the 
 
Briefs/NASRAContribBrief.pdf (noting that almost all public sector employees are required to con-
tribute towards public pension plans); see also supra note 98.  
 203 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A corporation is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.  An established body of law specifies 
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are 
associated with a corporation in one way or another.  When rights, whether constitutional or stat-
utory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 7 (“Indeed, a core goal of corporate law 
is to give directors and officers legal authority to act in ways with which shareholders may pro-
foundly disagree.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2017) (vesting power and duties vis-à-vis 
a corporation in its directors and officers); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light 
on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 927 (2013) (advocating for SEC rules to require 
public companies to disclose their political spending because “the interests of directors and execu-
tives with respect to such spending may frequently diverge from those of shareholders”); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate 
Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 340 (2015) (“Citizens United rests on the 
notion that stockholders in corporations are well positioned to exercise influence over corporate 
political-spending decisions and that corporate political spending will therefore be a legitimate re-
flection of stockholder sentiment.  But conservative corporate law theory is founded in important 
part on the premise that stockholders are poorly positioned to monitor corporate managers even 
for their fidelity to a profit-maximization goal.  Indeed, conservative corporate law theory teaches 
that it is often irrational for stockholders to exercise voice over even profit-related issues, much less 
to influence a particular corporation’s approach to political spending.”). 
 205 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2017); see also Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate 
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (describing the duty of good faith as recognized by Delaware courts). 
 206 A rulemaking petition calling for the disclosure of corporate political spending was submitted to the 
SEC in mid-2011, and as of December 2015 it had garnered more than 1.2 million comments but 
no action from the agency.  See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Hindering the SEC from 
Shining a Light on Political Spending, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/21/hindering-the-sec-from-shining-a-light-
on-political-spending/ (discussing omnibus budget rider to prevent SEC from proceeding with a 
rulemaking on disclosure of political spending); see also Alex Guillén, Senate Sends SEC Disclosure Rule 
to the Dust Bin, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2017, 7:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/sen-
ate-votes-to-kill-sec-disclosure-rule-234590 (reporting on vote to nullify SEC rule that would have 
required companies to disclose payments to foreign governments). 
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most recent federal budgets have barred the SEC from moving forward with 
any rulemaking on disclosure of political spending.207  As a result, “[s]hare-
holders in most public companies in the United States do not have the infor-
mation they need to determine whether the company engages in political 
spending, how much is spent, or who the recipients are.”208 
Even if shareholders do learn about a corporation’s spending decisions, 
they would have limited recourse to object under corporate law.  As Lucian 
Bebchuk and Robert Jackson observed after Citizens United, “Under existing 
law, political speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary business deci-
sions, which give directors and executives virtually plenary authority.”209  
Shareholders—individual or institution—have three choices to make their 
displeasure felt: vote for a new board of directors, sell their shares, or sue the 
company.210  Voting is of limited value.211  Many stocks are now held by 
intermediaries such as pension or mutual funds, so the actual source of the 
capital may not have a vote at all.212  Moreover, the likelihood of any single 
investor owning enough shares to impact corporate policy is slim.213  Selling 
the shares, even if an option (it is not for Sam or many investors), presents a 
Hobson’s choice of staying in the market and subsidizing expression one op-
poses or leaving and absorbing significant financial consequences. 
That leaves a lawsuit.  A successful derivative lawsuit must prove a breach 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, such as waste, fraud, or self-dealing.214  How-
ever, corporate directors can raise as a defense the “business judgment rule,” 
which prevents courts from second-guessing corporate board decisions “if 
 
 207 The 2017 budget continues to block the SEC from using any appropriated funds “to finalize, issue, 
or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions, con-
tributions to tax exempt organizations, or dues paid to trade associations.”  Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 635, 131 Stat. 135, 376 (2017). 
 208 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204, at 930.  Some large institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
have adopted policies recommending the disclosure of corporate political spending.  See, e.g., CAL. 
PUB. EMPS.’ RETIREMENT SYS., GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES ¶ III.B.7.f.iii. (Mar. 
16, 2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainability-
principles.pdf  (mandating “disclos[ure] on an annual basis [of] the amounts and recipients of mon-
etary and non-monetary contributions,” including any political spending done through intermediar-
ies).  Even this is cold comfort to the employee who provided the capital being invested. 
 209 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 83. 
 210 See, e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look, 79 
MO. L. REV. 283, 287–89 (2014).  
 211 See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 6–17. 
 212 See id. at 25 (showing that in 1950 more than 90% of stocks were held by individuals; that by 2009 
it was less than 40%; and that most of that percentage drop reflects the rise of institutional investors, 
who now own more than 50% of equities). 
 213 See id. at 10–23 (arguing that “most investors have little influence, direct or indirect, on a typical 
corporate board”). 
 214 See generally Leahy, supra note 210; Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 477, 478, 481 (2015). 
 
598 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:3 
ordinary business-persons could differ on the sufficiency of benefit received” 
and if there is no motive of personal interest or self-dealing.215  As Joseph 
Leahy recently explained: 
[The business judgment rule] instructs courts that, rather than look at the 
quality of the board’s decision (i.e., was the decision negligent?), the court should 
look to integrity of the board’s decision-making process (i.e., was the decision made 
in good faith, uninterested, independent, minimally informed, and not made 
in a grossly negligent manner?).  As a result, judges are effectively prohibited 
from evaluating the merits of rational, good faith business decisions.216   
It is difficult to imagine that a rule of judicial deference to corporate de-
cision-making would trump a constitutional concern should a shareholder 
pursue a First Amendment objection to corporate activity akin to the recent 
union fee challenges, but that issue has not yet reached the courts, and it is 
unlikely to until there is better disclosure of actual political expenses.217  It is 
also not clear how a shareholder or pension participant might best assert her 
rights.  Since Citizens United opened avenues for corporate political spending 
while dismissing shareholders’ constitutional concerns, considerable scholar-
ship has explored whether corporate law provides avenues to respond to the 
increase in corporate political spending.218  However, given the expanding 
reach of the First Amendment, it may well be that shareholders can look to 
constitutional law to make their case.  Indeed, the crux of the Court’s opinion 
in Hobby Lobby was that a company’s constitutional interest—there, religious 
liberty—resides in its shareholders.219   
From Sam’s vantage, the law requires him to give money to a corporation 
through his pension and allows it to be spent on a range of political activities 
over which he has no input or control.  If “corporate democracy” does not 
in fact meaningfully protect shareholders, the best defense corporations may 
be able to offer against First Amendment challenges to mandatory pension 
laws is to draw parallels to the mandatory agency fee provisions of federal 
 
 215 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72,76 (S.D.N.Y 1993), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 216 Leahy, supra note 210, at 298–99 (footnotes omitted). 
 217 In Barnes v. State Farm, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 90 (1993), an insurance policy holder challenged the 
company’s expenditures on a no-fault insurance initiative on both constitutional and corporate law 
grounds.  The court dismissed the constitutional claim on the merits, noting that the insurance 
company also had free speech rights to be balanced and rejecting a comparison to Abood because of 
“differences between compelled membership in a union and voluntary investment in a corpora-
tion.”  Id. at 92, 94.  It considered the corporate law claims separately, there applying the business 
judgment rule.  Id. at 94–95. 
 218 See generally, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204 (exploring the increased corporate political 
spending and the possible rules that would broaden access to such information for shareholders); 
William Alan Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of Corporate Waste to 
Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134 (2012) (exploring how sharehold-
ers may bring derivative claims to challenge corporate political spending they find to be detrimental 
to the corporation). 
 219 See supra note 203. 
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labor laws.220  Thus, it would seem, the corporate law professors’ brief and 
the implicit caution therein.221   
To sum up the unsettled law undergirding the Paycheck Problem: the 
government cannot force Sam to speak on its behalf.222  There is, however, 
absolutely no constitutional problem with Sam’s being compelled to subsi-
dize a program that constitutes government speech (even if the government 
is not identified as the speaker).223  If Sam were a “quasi-government” em-
ployee, it would be a violation of his constitutional rights to be forced to pay 
a fair share fee to his union, even if the union is bound to represent him and 
he benefits from this representation.224  As he appears to be a “full” govern-
ment employee, the Constitution allows a fair share fee to be assessed against 
him but he does not have to contribute to his union’s political spending—
although the jury (or Justice) is still out on whether that is only by grace of a 
teetering precedent.225  He does have to contribute to a corporation’s politi-
cal speech on the same issue, however.  Corporations are free to make inde-
pendent expenditures for or against political candidates and engage in other 
expressive activity with little, if any, obligation to protect the constitutional 
rights of those who are putting up money to support the enterprise.226  Officer 
Sam may find recent trends encouraging for his own purposes, but we cannot 
blame him if he is left scratching his head.   
The first step to resolving these issues is to develop a coherent theory of 
how to approach individual claims of conscience when they seek to dismantle 
or substantially undermine collective enterprises.  That is the task that the 
second half of this Article takes up.  The next Part considers the import of 
the cases discussed above on the Paycheck Problem and questions, first, 
whether under current doctrine there are any solid theoretical grounds to 
treat mandatory pension contributions differently than mandatory agency 
fees and, second, whether the Court has articulated a coherent rationale for 
setting taxes apart from these other forms of compelled subsidy. 
 
 220 Of course, unions remain barred from using nonmembers funds on political activity.  See supra Part 
I.C.1. 
 221 This analysis is my own.  I know none of the authors of the corporate law professors’ amicus brief, 
and it carefully avoids connecting these dots, observing only that “[i]f this Court chooses to grant 
additional First Amendment rights to union nonmembers, it will only further increase the extent to 
which they enjoy greater rights than do corporate shareholders.”  Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, 
supra note 181, at 39.  
 222 See supra text accompanying notes 40–42.  
 223 See supra text accompanying notes 82–92. 
 224 See supra text accompanying notes 130–135. 
 225 See supra text accompanying notes 177–178. 
 226 See supra text accompanying notes 195–218. 
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II.  RECONCILING DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
The cases discussed above may simply reflect the proclivities of a pro-
corporate, anti-union, libertarian Court.  But the language used in the 
Court’s recent decisions has serious implications, particularly for our ability 
to address problems through collective action.  In the first Subpart, I consider 
grounds on which we might distinguish unions from pensions for the pur-
poses of compelled subsidy analysis and find none.  I then turn to whether 
the Court’s discussion of the compulsion to fund government speech offers 
solid theoretical grounds to distinguish taxes from pensions and unions and 
again come up short.  This is not to say that we cannot distinguish taxes from 
other payments under the First Amendment, but that the Court’s focus on 
the burden compelled subsidies pose to individual liberty interests has pre-
vented it from doing so.  For those who do not want to see the First Amend-
ment used as a “blunderbuss” to dismantle collective programs, these anal-
yses highlight some shortcomings within the current doctrine and set the 
scene for the following Part, where I propose three possible paths forward.227 
A.  Comparing Unions and Pensions 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court in recent years has glossed over 
differences between compelled speech and compelled subsidy, and it has 
taken an increasingly broad view of what kind of speech might trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny and an increasingly constricted view of the govern-
ment’s interests and the fit between the law and its intended purpose.  Based 
on the arguments advanced by a majority of the Justices in Knox, Harris, and 
the Friedrichs oral argument, funding of not only political speech but also 
speech that touches on matters of public concern and speech that has the 
potential to impact the government’s budget raise constitutional issues; under 
the reasoning of United Foods, compelled support for any speech, even purely 
commercial speech, appears to merit, at the least, exacting scrutiny.228  It 
appears only a matter of time before a public pension contributor brings a 
First Amendment challenge to the requirement that he subsidize corporate 
political activity or, more broadly, corporate actions affecting public pol-
icy.229  The following discussion sets union agency fees and pension contri-
 
 227 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Essay, A Locked Phone; Unlocked Corporate Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 287, 287 (2016), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-
Online-287.pdf (discussing the Roberts Court’s “blunderbuss use of the First Amendment to inval-
idate key laws, including those regulating money in politics”). 
 228 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001); see also supra Part I.C.2–3; supra note 
37 and accompanying text. 
 229 Then again, as John Oliver has observed, “if you want to do something evil, put it inside something 
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butions next to each other and considers potential justifications for differen-
tial, or asymmetric, treatment.  The question being considered is not what 
should be done to protect the interests of dissenters—I save that for the final 
Part—but simply whether there are valid grounds to distinguish agency fees 
from pension contributions for First Amendment purposes. 
1.  The Case for Symmetry 
It is not difficult to make the case for symmetrical treatment of union 
agency fees and pension contributions, particularly when one considers the 
percentage of pension funds that flows to corporations.  Today 50% or more 
of the average public pension is invested in public equities, a marked depar-
ture from the 1950s, when 96% of public pension holdings were invested in 
fixed-income assets and cash.230  The most obvious point of overlap, as dis-
cussed above, is the fact that both organizations can use their accumulated 
funds to make political expenditures.  Yet under Abood and its progeny, non-
germane union political speech cannot be funded by dissenting employees; 
by contrast, under Citizens United, corporations are free to use shareholder 
funds for identical political spending.231   
The Supreme Court’s placating statements about dissenting contributors’ 
rights being safeguarded by “corporate democracy” do not provide a basis 
for distinguishing corporations from unions; in fact, quite the opposite.  Cor-
porations and unions do share many features, such as regular election of di-
rectors,232 a fiduciary duty of loyalty,233 and detailed reporting require-
ments.234  For unions, these are set out in the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), which also provides a detailed “bill of 
rights” protecting employees’ ability to participate in the union to a greater 
 
boring.”  Last Week Tonight (@LastWeekTonight), TWITTER (June 2, 2014, 8:21 AM), 
https://twitter.com/LastWeekTonight/status/473484569757638656. 
 230 See Investment, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, http://www.nasra.org/investment 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018); see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 
STATE PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENTS SHIFT OVER PAST 30 YEARS 2 (2014), http:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/06/state_public_pension_investments_shift_over_ 
past_30_years.pdf (“Data from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the United States reveal 
that in 1952, nearly 96 percent of public pension assets were invested in fixed-income asset classes 
and cash.  By 1992, the proportion of pension assets in fixed-income investments and cash had 
decreased to 47 percent, and by 2012, it had fallen to 27 percent.” (citations omitted)). 
 231 See supra notes 93–125, 195–218 and accompanying text. 
 232 29 U.S.C. § 481 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–42 (2017). 
 233 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); see, e.g., Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Guth 
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 234 29 U.S.C. §§ 431–441 (2012); see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 23, at 116 (observing that “corpo-
rations and unions have been subjected to nearly identical legal schemas” for the last six decades).  
See generally DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL 
(2017) (providing an overview of the copious regulations that govern corporate financial disclosures). 
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extent than the average shareholder—and certainly someone who invests 
through a pension or mutual fund—can participate in corporate decision-
making.235  As Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky recently noted, “In 
contrast to the extensive federal regulation of union governance and dues 
collection under the LMRDA, the law of corporations gives shareholders rel-
atively little power to control the decision making or disclosures of corpora-
tions and absolutely no power over its political speech.”236  Thus to the extent 
dissenters’ free speech interests can be assuaged by referral to internal proce-
dures, any comparison between unions and corporations suggests that these 
procedures are stronger in the union context. 
This disconnect has already attracted calls for better transparency and 
accountability for corporate political spending.237  Even before the Court’s 
opinions in Knox and Harris confirmed a widening substantive gap in how 
some Justices view the rights of dissenting union-shop employees as opposed 
to dissenting shareholders, commentators observed that post-Citizens United it 
was structurally far more difficult for a dissenting shareholder to identify 
problematic political speech and object to subsidizing it than for a dissenting 
union member to do the same.238  Two prominent law review articles, one 
by Professor Benjamin Sachs, and the other by Professors Fisk and Chemer-
insky, engaged in thorough analyses of the Court’s holdings and considered 
whether any arguments supported the differential treatment of unions and 
corporations vis-à-vis their political transparency, accountability, and spend-
ing.239  Both concluded that unions and corporations should be treated the 
same in these regards and, moreover, that union-shop employees and share-
holders had equally valid interests in how their money was spent.240  The 
authors differed, however, regarding the solution.  Professor Sachs would like 
to see corporations become more transparent and offer shareholders an opt-
out or refund of political spending in line with unions’ agency fees; Professors 
Fisk and Chemerinsky believe that continuing to separate the “political” 
from the “germane” would be too difficult to administer for both unions and 
 
 235 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 
(1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (establishing a 
“[b]ill of rights; constitution and bylaws of labor organizations”). 
 236 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1083–84 (“Surely that unions are compelled by law to run as 
democracies and to respect the free speech rights of minorities, while corporations are not, is reason 
to suggest that employees should not have greater dissenters’ rights than shareholders.”). 
 237 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for Shareholders After Citizens United?, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 459 
(2011); Russell Mangas, Citizens United Against Dissenting Shareholders, 46 TULSA L. REV. 409 (2011); 
Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2011) . 
 238 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204 (explaining that the law currently requires unions to 
disclose more information than corporations); Sachs, supra note 19. 
 239 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1083–84; Sachs, supra note 19. 
 240 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1080–85; Sachs, supra note 19. 
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corporations and fails to recognize that these organizations have their own 
First Amendment rights.241   
This Article will not resolve this dispute, although it adds to the discus-
sion.  For present purposes, the salient fact is that a rising tide of scholar-
ship—and, indeed, regulatory rumblings242—recognizes that shareholders 
may have a constitutionally-protected interest infringed when their invest-
ment is used by a corporate board for political purposes in a way that is 
closely analogous to the interests of an objecting union nonmember.  In light 
of the Court’s holdings in Knox and Harris, Sam’s concerns about his inability 
to opt out of his pension seem well-placed. 
What few scholars have noted is that the cases discussed above suggest 
that a shareholder’s First Amendment rights may be implicated not only 
when a corporation engages in political speech, but also when it merely en-
gages in speech affecting matters of public concern or that impacts govern-
ment spending.243  Recall that the Court’s decision in United Foods appeared 
to indicate—as have some of its other recent holdings on speech re-
strictions—that it is no longer willing to provide a less exacting review to 
commercial speech or economic regulations.244  There the Court found the 
First Amendment implicated simply because the petitioners were required to 
“subsidize speech with which they disagree,” and when given the opportunity 
to soften that language in Johanns, it declined to do so.245   
Sam’s objection to his pension investment is not just that the company 
runs ads promoting political candidates he opposes.  He does not want his 
money invested in a company that promotes a product he opposes, lobbies to 
advance its interests on a politically-charged topic, negotiates state contracts, 
and receives taxpayer money through its government contracts.  Consider 
 
 241 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1087; Sachs, supra note 19, at 869. 
 242 See supra note 206; see also BRUCE FREED ET AL., CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
(2015), http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index/CPA-Zicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf 
(scoring companies on voluntary actions they have taken to disclose political and ideological spend-
ing). 
 243 Cf. Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 4 (“[M]ost individual shareholders cannot 
obtain full information about corporate speech or political activities, even after the fact, nor can they 
prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree.” (emphasis added)). 
 244 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–72 (2011) (finding a Vermont statute that imposed burdens on corporate 
speech to warrant heightened scrutiny); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467 (2010) (finding 
a law that criminalizes the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal 
cruelty was invalid under the First Amendment). 
 245 United Foods Inc., 533 U.S. at 411; see also id. at 410 (“The subject matter of the speech may be of 
interest to but a small segment of the population; yet those whose business and livelihood depend 
in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as 
important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which values the 
freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts.”). 
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these objections in light of cases we have already reviewed.  In both Knox and 
Harris, a majority of the Court suggested that a public employee subject to an 
agency fee faced an “exacting” First Amendment burden because public un-
ion collective bargaining negotiations were “political” in that they touched on 
a matter of “public concern.”  For example, for proof that the home health 
workers’ collective bargaining involved matters of “public concern,” Justice 
Alito pointed to the fact that salary negotiations had the potential to affect 
“Medicaid funding” or “state spending for employee benefits.”246 
Under this logic, it is not difficult to show how pension contributions raise 
compelled subsidy concerns beyond corporate political spending.  Pension 
money is invested in many corporations that lobby, engage in activities of 
public concern, and make decisions that have the potential to significantly 
impact federal or state spending programs, including Medicaid.  Consider 
some of the top holdings of CalPERS, the state pension fund to which Cali-
fornia teachers are required to contribute.247  Some of the companies receiv-
ing CalPERS pension funds impact government spending directly—Johnson 
& Johnson, for example, negotiates Medicaid reimbursement rates with gov-
ernment regulators248—while others have significant indirect impacts.  For 
 
 246 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014). 
 247 CalPERS Retirement Benefits, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://ctainvest.org/home/CalSTRS-
CalPERS/about-calpers/calpers-retirement-benefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 248 See CALPERS, 2014–15 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 103 (2015) (listing John-
son & Johnson as the fourth largest holder of CalPERS stock); see also Janet Elliott, Johnson & Johnson 
Settles Texas Medicaid Fraud Lawsuit for $158 Million, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120119-johnson-johnson-settles-texas-medi-
caid-fraud-lawsuit-for-158-million.  The “top 10” list also includes companies such as JP Morgan 
and Exxon Mobile, both companies that had significant impact on public budgets in recent decades.  
CALPERS, supra note 248, at 103; Damian Carrington & Harry Davies, US Taxpayers Subsidising 
World’s Biggest Fossil Fuel Companies, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/environment/2015/may/12/us-taxpayers-subsidising-worlds-biggest-fossil-fuel-compa-
nies (listing state subsidies received by oil companies); Steven Davidoff, JPMorgan’s $12 Billion 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Mar. 18, 2008, 9:22 AM), https://dealbook.ny-
times.com/2008/03/18/jpmorgans-12-billion-bailout/ (“Even assuming that JPMorgan ulti-
mately has to pay more for Bear than its $2-per-share-offer—a big assumption—the market’s initial 
view is that this takeover of an imploding Wall Street firm was a wealth transfer to JPMorgan’s 
shareholders of this amount.  Where did this transfer come from? Well, it came from the Federal 
Reserve and from Bear.  The Federal Reserve has guaranteed Bear’s liabilities to the tune of $30 
billion.”); Brendan Greeley, JPMorgan’s $10 Billion Subsidy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 2, 
2012, 6:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-02/jpmorgans-10-billion-
subsidy (citing study estimating that from 2007 to 2010 “JPMorgan saved just under $10 billion 
thanks to its size and importance”); Joanna Walters, Exxon Valdez - 25 Years After the Alaska Oil Spill, 
The Court Battle Continues, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/northamerica/usa/10717219/Exxon-Valdez-25-years-after-the-Alaska-oil-spill-the-court-
battle-continues.html (noting that 25 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaskan officials were 
seeking nearly $100 million to compensate for environmental damages caused by the accident). 
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example, Chevron decided in late 2015 to lay off several thousand employ-
ees,249 and Wells Fargo recently settled a case for mortgage loan violations 
with the Federal Housing Administration for $1.2 billion.250  As for affecting 
“state spending for employee benefits,” 82% of all public employees (includ-
ing California public school teachers) are covered by a defined benefit (as 
opposed to a defined contribution) pension plan, which means that if the 
pension plan investments fail to perform as expected, the funds to cover the 
promised benefits come from the public treasury.251  One need only review 
the names of some of the companies in which public pensions invest—Apple, 
Exxon Mobile, General Electric, Microsoft, Verizon—to appreciate that 
these entities, and how they choose to spend their money, broadly implicate 
many areas of “public concern.”252   
It is fair to ask whether all corporate or pension fund activities are expres-
sive and subject to First Amendment protection.  Certainly some do not com-
port with our traditional understanding of “speech,” but as noted above, the 
Court has long applied the First Amendment to non-speech activities with 
expressive elements.253  Regardless, this argument resolves nothing.  Many 
corporate activities, such as promoting ideas or products, negotiating con-
tracts, lobbying, and making and communicating a decision, are clearly ex-
pressive; many are activities, indeed, described by the Court in Harris.254  To 
the extent Sam wishes to opt out of an organization’s expressive activities, 
however defined, the contexts appear symmetrical. 
Moreover, Sam’s compelled union and pension payments strike equally 
at his autonomy interests.  The personal indignation that individuals may feel 
at the thought of their money going towards a negotiation that advances po-
sitions with which they disagree in the union context is of a kind with the 
indignation individuals may feel about their money subsidizing decisions 
made by a pension fund to, for example, invest in fossil fuels or firearms man-
ufacturers, or the decision of a corporation in which individuals’ money is 
 
 249 Shiv Mehta, Chevron to Lay Off 6000–7000 Employees, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 2, 2015, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/110215/chevron-lay-60007000-employees.asp. 
 250 Brena Swanson, It’s Official: Wells Fargo Reaches Largest Settlement in FHA History, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 
8, 2016), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/36749-its-official-wells-fargo-reaches-largest-set-
tlement-in-fha-history. 
 251 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS tbl.5.1d (2015), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2005.pdf. 
 252 See CALPERS, supra note 248, at 103. 
 253 See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
 254 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014); see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 
552, 567–71 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“The First Amendment literally 
forbids the abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not 
end at the spoken or written word.”). 
 
606 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:3 
invested to, for example, discriminate against LGBT employees or engage in 
a corporate tax inversion.255 
Of course, pension funds also provide contributing employees with a sig-
nificant personal financial benefit.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 
2015 the average state and local pension annual payment was $26,684.256  But 
union membership also provides employees significant personal financial ben-
efits.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2015 full-time unionized 
wage and salary workers earned an average of $980 a week; non-unionized 
workers earned $776.257  At fifty-two weeks a year for thirty years, this is a 
premium of $318,240.  In the public sector, the advantage of being represented 
by a union is, on average, $145 a week, or $226,200 over thirty years.258  Em-
ployees represented by unions also receive better benefits.259  It is not surprising 
 
 255 In a recent article, James Nelson argues that the “freedom-of-conscience principle” provides 
grounds for distinguishing corporations from unions because “the degree of intermediation in mod-
ern capital markets . . . render[s] claims of shareholder complicity much less compelling.”  James 
Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1969, 2015 (2016).  This is 
a troubling argument for many reasons, not the least of which is that it suggests that the more 
complex a system, the fewer constitutional rights one has when participating in it.  Thus, it would 
not matter for First Amendment purposes if corporations amass and spend political war chests sev-
eral times greater than unions, corporations make significant undisclosed electioneering expendi-
tures with shareholder funds, or even that employees can opt out of their union’s political activities.  
This argument also rests on assumptions about what one might call “reasonable indignation” as a 
trigger for constitutional rights, which would discount the interests of more politically and socially 
aware investors.  Salience is a difficult constitutional touchstone. 
 256 PHILLIP VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE- AND 
LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY BRIEF: 2015, at 2 (2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/g15-aspp-sl.pdf. 
 257 BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3; see also JULIE ANDERSON ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RESEARCH, BRIEFING PAPER NO. R409, THE UNION ADVANTAGE FOR WOMEN 4–9 (2015), 
http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-union-advantage-for-women (reporting that the in-
come gap between men and women is smaller for unionized employees).  These numbers do not 
control for other variables.  A study in 2011 did attempt to isolate the effect of right-to-work laws.  
“All told, our model controls for 42 demographic, economic, geographic, and policy factors.  After 
controlling for this full complement of differences, we find wages in [right-to-work] states to be sta-
tistically and economically significantly lower than in non-[right-to-work] states. On average, ‘right-
to-work’ laws are associated with wages—for everyone, not just union members—that are 3.2% 
lower than they would be without such a law.”  ELISE GOULD & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POLICY 
INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 299, THE COMPENSATION PENALTY OF “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS 5 
(2011), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper299.pdf.   
 258 BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3, at tbl.4.  As reported by Petitioners in Friedrichs, agency fees 
for California public school teachers run about $600–650 a year, while full union membership “is 
often approximately $1,000 per teacher” a year.  Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 7.  This can 
be up to 2% of an entry-level salary, and presumably less as they become more senior.  Id.  Pension 
contributions, by contrast, are set at 7% of a teacher’s salary throughout their career.  CalPERS 
Retirement Benefits, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://ctainvest.org/home/CalSTRS-CalPERS/about-
calpers/calpers-retirement-benefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 259 See George Long, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Differences Between Union and Nonunion Compensation, 
2001–2011, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Apr. 2013, at 17, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/ 
04/art2full.pdf (reporting that in 2011 unionized employees received employee benefits worth 
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that, according to counsel at the Friedrichs oral argument, “Ms. Friedrichs has 
said publicly she’s happy with the positions the union is taking on pay.”260 
To the extent one is concerned about a dissenting union-shop employee 
subsidizing union political speech, a very similar concern arises in the pen-
sion context.  Likewise, to the extent one is concerned about a dissenting 
union-shop employee subsidizing union activities that affect matters of public 
concern or the public fisc, pension contributions are also implicated.  The 
question is whether there are any good justifications for not treating these 
instances of compelled subsidy the same for First Amendment purposes.   
2.  The Case for Asymmetry 
We can begin by looking at some of the potential grounds for distinction 
that have already been discussed in legal scholarship.  In his analysis of cor-
porate political spending in the wake of Citizens United, Professor Sachs argued 
that shareholders should be given the opportunity to opt out of corporate po-
litical spending in a manner analogous to the opt-out allowed union nonmem-
bers.261  He considered and rejected three sets of arguments for treating the 
corporate and union contexts differently.  Two of these—the degree of com-
pulsion and the presence of state action—are not implicated in the Paycheck 
Problem, where contributions to the public pension fund are required by law 
as a term of state employment.262  The third—“potential differences between 
the kinds of speech and associational rights that are implicated in the union 
and corporate contexts”—is worth examining more closely.263 
Professor Sachs identified two differences in kind between unions and cor-
porations that could be relevant to fine-tuning an opt-out right in each con-
text.  The first is the nature of the association.  While unions may strike one 
as expressive organizations and corporations commercial ones, in fact—and 
as the Supreme Court has recognized—both are mixed-purpose entities, with 
both economic and expressive functions.264  However, to the extent that un-
 
$7.11 an hour more than benefits received by non-unionized employees). 
 260 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per 
curiam) (No. 14-915). 
 261 Sachs, supra note 19, at 851. 
 262 See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, NASRA ISSUE BRIEF: EMPLOYEE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS app. A (2017), http://www.nasra.org/files/Is-
sue%20Briefs/NASRAContribBrief.pdf (listing the percentage of income various public employees 
are required to contribute to their pension).  Professors Fisk and Chemerinksy also consider state 
action as a potential basis for separate treatment.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1080–85.  
Their second ground for distinction—democratic protections—is discussed above as it appears to be 
more of a symmetry than an asymmetry.  See id. at 1081–84; supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 263 Sachs, supra note 19, at 851. 
 264 Id. (citing, inter alia, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986), to demonstrate 
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ions engage not just in political expression but also in the germination of po-
litical ideas—and to the extent that corporations do not fill the same role in 
shaping public opinion265—Professor Sachs suggests that union nonmembers 
might be afforded greater opt-out rights than shareholders, as potentially 
more union activity could be considered political.266  Even if this distinction 
has merit, it speaks to a question of degrees.  It does not undercut the point 
that compelled subsidy arguments would apply in the corporate context.267   
The second difference Professor Sachs identifies is that as a matter of sali-
ence and personal identity, some attach greater significance to being a union 
member than to being a corporate shareholder.268  But again, even if true, this 
might provide an additional cause of action for an employee whose identity is 
tightly bound with the union; it would not support ignoring the First Amend-
ment rights of corporate shareholders.  It is also difficult to see why payment 
of agency fees by nonmembers makes their relationship to the organization 
more salient or burdensome than, in our case, pension contributions.  No one 
is required to be a member of a union.  To the extent that payment of an 
agency fee does lead to union speech being actually attributed to a nonmem-
ber—the functional equivalent of putting words into the employee’s mouth—
this could mean that in the union context both compelled subsidization and 
compelled speech arguments are implicated, while in the corporate context 
only compelled subsidization would provide a basis for complaint.  As Profes-
sor Sachs notes, however, under the Supreme Court’s current cases “either 
type of objection is sufficient for First Amendment purposes.”269 
The differences identified by Professor Sachs offer potential analytical 
nuances in how we think about mandatory contributions to corporations and 
unions, but they do not change the fact that similar First Amendment inter-
ests arise in both the corporate and union contexts vis-à-vis political spend-
ing.  Below I consider a few additional arguments for treating the compelled 
subsidy of speech in these two areas asymmetrically. 
One argument goes not to whether the First Amendment is implicated 
but whether the compelled subsidization should be found unconstitutional 
under a balancing test: if objecting pension contributors were allowed to opt 
 
that the Court understands that “the predominant purpose of both [corporations and unions] is 
economic”). 
 265 But see Michelle Conlin & Lucas Iberico Lozada, The New U.S. Office Politics: Funding Your Boss’s Po-
litical Causes, REUTERS (May 11, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
workers-insight-idUSKBN0NW0AC20150511 (reporting on a sharp uptick by employers encour-
aging their employees to make political donations to particular candidates).  Such germination oc-
curs in the employer-employee context, however, not the corporation-shareholder context. 
 266 Sachs, supra note 19, at 851. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. at 855. 
 269 Id. at 858. 
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out of pension payments, there would be significant externalities in that the 
cost would be borne by the taxpayer.270  This is because the vast majority of 
public pensions are still defined benefit plans, in which the payout to the 
beneficiary is fixed regardless of the amount of money invested in the plan or 
the plan’s returns on investment.271  There are three ways to frame this con-
cern: that allowing the opt-out would hurt the public fisc (in that it would be 
required to do more with less); that it would hurt taxpayers (in that they 
would be required to pay more to maintain the required benefit level); or that 
it would hurt other employees (whose own pension contributions may be in-
creased to make up for the shortfall).   
These are three potential government interests that could be framed as 
compelling, but they are not much different than the government interests 
that have been raised in the union cases (they also bear close parallels to in-
terests the Court recently rejected in Hobby Lobby272).  To take them in reverse 
order, the concern that allowing an opt-out would result in negative exter-
nalities for similarly-situated employees is identical in both contexts; both 
would be asked to bear additional costs, while their dissenting colleagues 
would reap the benefits without paying.  The concerns about the impact on 
taxpayers and on the public fisc is similar in both contexts, although not the 
same.  The connection between allowing opt-outs and the effect on the public 
treasury is cleaner in the pension context, as the commitment to the benefi-
ciary has already been established.  In the union context, the nature and dis-
tribution of the costs involves legislative judgments, but these are exactly the 
kind of decisions to which the judiciary traditionally defers.273  We will leave 
to one side suggestions by Justice Scalia in the Friedrichs oral argument that 
any shortfall that the CTA experienced as a result of lost agency fee revenue 
could be made up by government (taxpayer) funding274—a suggestion that 
would allow a direct parallel to the pension context but was rejected out of 
hand by the union’s counsel as antithetical to the notion of collective bar-
gaining.275  The government’s interests in maintaining “labor peace” and 
 
 270 But see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (“[T]his Court has rejected as ‘star-
tling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
470 (2010))). 
 271 See supra note 251. 
 272 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780–82 (2014). 
 273 See, e.g., Ry. Emp. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234–36 (1956) (finding that “the question is one 
of policy with which the judiciary has no concern”). 
 274 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(per curiam) (No. 14-915) (asking if government funding of a union would be “bargainable”—“It’s 
never existed in American society” was, in part, counsel’s response); see also Aaron Tang, Public Sector 
Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2016) (propos-
ing a “government-payer alternative” to union agency fees). 
 275 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (arguing that a 
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preventing “free riding” ultimately reflect a determination by the state or 
locality that the costs of negotiating and administering a set of employee con-
tracts without a compulsory union is greater than doing so with a union.  The 
legislature may base this judgment on many factors, including the potential 
costs of declining union representation,276 the potential costs of workplace 
protests,277 or the potential costs of training and equipment that the union 
would no longer be able to offer.278  Or it may simply see the disadvantage 
of separately negotiating, in the case of the CTA, more than 325,000 indi-
vidual contracts.279  As demonstrated in the briefs filed in the Friedrichs case, 
economic data can be martialed on both sides—employees in “right to work” 
states, for example, are less likely to receive pensions or health insurance, 
creating costs that may be borne by other taxpayers,280 yet many of these 
states have lower average tax rates281—but the point of this exercise is not to 
resolve the economic impact of labor laws, merely to say that governments 
that support agency fees may have reasonable financial interests for keeping 
 
public employer could not “all of a sudden say, sure, we’re going to take our taxpayer dollars and 
start giving money to unions”); see also id. at 40.  Justice Scalia also mentioned at the oral argument 
that federal unions do not charge nonmembers agency fees.  Id at 50.  This is true, but federal law 
permits employee union representatives to work on union matters during their regular working 
hours, meaning that taxpayers are literally subsidizing federal unions.  See, e.g., F. Vincent 
Vernuccio & Trey Kovacs, Official Time: Government Workers Perform Union Duties on the Taxpayers’ Dime, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERP. INST. (Nov. 1, 2011), https://cei.org/content/official-time-government-
workers-perform-union-duties-taxpayers%E2%80%99-dime (describing how “[t]here is no law or 
regulation requiring the government to determine and report how much time union members 
spend on union work at the public’s expense”). 
 276 See, e.g., Jenn Hagedorn et al., The Role of Labor Unions in Creating Working Conditions That Promote Public 
Health, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 989 (2016) (associating the decline of union power with the “great-
est level of economic inequity in our nation’s history”). 
 277 See, e.g., Brief for the Attorney General of California at 8, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) 
(“[E]xclusive representation can provide an efficient mechanism for school employers to learn 
about employee needs, to resolve issues that could otherwise cause conflict in the workplace . . . .”). 
 278 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 57–58, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (arguing 
that “[i]t’s actually essential to have agency fees, because they are using those fees to benefit all of 
the workers in the—in the unit through getting additional equipment that the county may not be 
able to afford, additional training . . . .”). 
 279 About Us, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://www.cta.org/About-CTA/Who-We-Are/CTA-Fact-
Sheet.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 280 See GOULD & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 257, at 6.  Compare Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan 
and Seventeen Other States in Support of Petitioners at 9–20, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-
915) (relying on economic data to blame municipal bankruptcies, in part, on public unions), with 
Brief for Cities, Counties, and Elected Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18–
29, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (relying on economic data to argue that public unions 
promote efficiency and save tax dollars). 
 281 See Tax Burdens Lighter in Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://nrtwc.org/tax-burdens-lighter-in-right-to-work-states; see also Tamara Kay, The Lies, Damn 
Lies, and Statistics Behind the Boom in America’s Right-to-Work Laws, QUARTZ (May 1, 2015), 
http://qz.com/396598/the-lies-damn-lies-and-statistics-behind-the-boom-in-americas-right-to-
work-laws/ (arguing that “right-to-work laws result in lower wages and lower likelihood of health 
care and pensions for union and non-union workers”). 
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them in place.  It would take some overreach for the judiciary to supplant 
legislative judgment on a question of fiscal impact.282   
Of course, the argument above rests on the troubling presumption that a 
First Amendment right could be abrogated for purely economic reasons.283  
Likewise, an argument that pension funds and corporations have, by virtue 
of corporate and pension law, a fiduciary duty that already safeguards a con-
tributor’s money is both, at some levels, non-responsive to the symmetry in-
quiry—unions also have fiduciary duties and reporting requirements284—
and suggests a hierarchy of analysis that places fiduciary protections over 
constitutional ones.285  A more powerful expression of a government interest 
in preventing externalities, and one that a few labor law scholars have ad-
vanced in recent years, would recognize that allowing an opt-out would cre-
ate a class of what I have elsewhere termed “unwilling donors,” who them-
selves have a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to subsidize 
speech in support of non-contributors.286  This does not serve, however, to 
distinguish pension payments from union payments; so long as the unions or 
pension funds are required to distribute benefits equally among contributors 
and non-contributors, an unwilling donor problem will exist, and First 
Amendment issues appear on both sides. 
A final argument for asymmetric treatment of unions and pension pay-
ments is the possibility that the government would be able to assert that the 
actions of the pension fund and, by virtue of the pension fund’s intervention, 
the corporation, are government speech and thus not susceptible to First 
Amendment challenges.  At the Friedrichs oral argument, Respondents an-
swered in the negative when asked whether unions were governmental actors 
for the purposes of the government speech doctrine.287  For present purposes, 
 
 282 But see Jennifer Mason McAward, Foreword, The Confident Court, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 379, 379 
(2012) (observing that “a majority of the Supreme Court is increasingly willing to supplant both the 
prudential and legal judgments of other institutional actors”). 
 283 This is not to say that fiscal impact has no place in a constitutional analysis, but it does not alone 
manifest a compelling interest.  Cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (over-
turning a collective marketing program). 
 284 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 431–441 (2012) (setting forth reporting requirements for unions); OFFICE OF 
LABOR-MGMT. STANDARDS, U.S DEP’T OF LABOR, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE 
LMRDA AND CSRA 8–9 (2009), https://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rights_resps.pdf 
(listing a union officer’s fiduciary obligations).  
 285 Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 231 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Surely it cannot be said, for 
example, that if Congress were to declare editorial writers fiduciaries for their readers and establish 
a licensing scheme under which ‘unqualified’ writers were forbidden to publish, this Court would 
be powerless to hold that the legislation violated the First Amendment.”). 
 286 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 95; Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 28; cf. Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling 
Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1783 (2015) (arguing that campaign finance jurisprudence should broaden 
to take into account the interests of donors who feel “shaken down”). 
 287 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–25, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(per curiam) (No. 14-915).   
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we need not exhaustively analyze what does and does not—or should and 
should not—constitute government speech.288  Happily, the instant question 
already has been examined in some depth.  In response to Citizens United, 
Professor Eric Alden considered whether individuals compelled to contribute 
to public pensions could raise First Amendment objections to corporate po-
litical activity, answering the question in the affirmative.289  In doing so, he 
evaluated the potential counterargument that public pensions—with partic-
ular reference to CalPERS—should be shielded by the government speech 
doctrine.290  In brief, Professor Alden compared the agricultural marketing 
scheme at issue in Johanns—which was found to constitute government 
speech—and the state bar at issue in Keller—which was found, despite being 
considered a state agency in other contexts, not to engage in government 
speech—and determined that in structure, governance, and independence, 
the state pension fund operates too independently for its actions to be con-
sidered government speech.291 
There is, of course, a paradox embedded in this last argument, and in 
suggestions that the government could—and perhaps should—subsidize un-
ion activities directly.292  Why are we so concerned about protecting the 
rights of dissenters qua employees who object to union speech while at the 
same time those same dissenters qua taxpayers would have no ability to re-
fuse to pay for essentially the same speech?   
The next Subpart considers possible explanations for this dichotomy.  
The analysis reveals not that taxes are not unique, but that, as articulated, 
the Supreme Court’s theory of the First Amendment’s protections fails to 
capture what makes them so.  This in turn leads to suggestions in the final 
Part of this Article for how the Supreme Court might move forward with a 
more robust limiting principle in its First Amendment cases. 
 
 288 See Finseth Alden, supra note 19, at 290. 
 289 Id. at 333–45. 
 290 Id. at 344. 
 291 See id at 331–44 (developing an “independent instrumentality” test to determine if speech qualifies 
as government speech: “If a body or organization established by statute is governed administratively 
in a manner not subject to effective control by the executive branch of government (and not subject 
to detailed statutory prescription of the precise content of its political and ideological activities and 
messages), that body or organization should be regarded as an independent public instrumentality 
with sufficient autonomy in its operations that its political and ideological activities should be re-
garded as its own and not necessarily ascribed to the government generally for purposes of the 
government speech doctrine.”); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555, 560–
65 (2005) (plurality opinion); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990). 
 292 See supra note 274 (discussing the feasibility of union funding coming from the employer rather than 
members). 
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B.  Considering the Case for “Tax Exceptionalism” in Compelled Subsidy of Speech 
Cases 
1.  The Court’s Justifications Do Not Provide Grounds to Distinguish Taxes from 
Pensions and Unions 
To start with the obvious: the U.S. tax system is massive.  The Internal 
Revenue Code weighs in at nearly four million words, and in 2016 nearly 140 
million tax returns were filed.293  The analysis below, however, proceeds from 
the assumption that this characteristic alone distinguishes the tax system from 
unions and pensions only as a matter of degree, not kind.  “Too big to opt 
out” is not a satisfying constitutional principle.  The question is whether there 
is a more meaningful basis for distinction and, if so, what that might mean for 
the Court’s future First Amendment cases.  What is remarkable is not that 
such a basis exists—I suggest one below—but that the Court has not articu-
lated one, hence its “ipse dixit” creation of the government speech doctrine.294 
Let us consider the reasons the Court has provided in recent years for 
refusing to grant taxpayers “opt outs,” starting with United States v. Lee, where 
the Court declined to exempt an Amish employer from the Social Security 
tax.295  First were administrative considerations.  The argument, as para-
phrased in Hobby Lobby, was that “allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion 
of their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos.”296  Relat-
edly, the Lee majority argued that opening the door to religious challenges 
would undermine the effectiveness of the tax system.297   
Increasing the complexity of the U.S. tax system has not deterred policymak-
ers to date—indeed, the Social Security system itself accommodates individual 
religious objections—nor did it deter the Court in Hobby Lobby.298  It is difficult 
 
 293 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 2017-40-
014, RESULTS OF THE 2016 FILING SEASON 1 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/audit-
reports/2017reports/201740014fr.pdf; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., THE COMPLEXITY OF 
THE TAX CODE 6 (2012) [hereinafter TAS Report], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-
annual-report/downloads/most-serious-problems-tax-code-complexity.pdf.  
 294 Post, supra note 29, at 197. 
 295 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 296 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014); see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that although Mr. Lee’s challenge could presumably be easily 
accommodated—the statute already excepted self-employed Amish people—opening the door to 
these types of challenges would open the door to all sorts of “difficulties associated with processing 
other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds”).  The Hobby Lobby Court, by contrast, rejected 
the possibility that its decision could similarly “lead to a flood of religious objections regarding a 
wide variety of medical procedures and drugs.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. 
 297 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (“The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge 
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”). 
 298 See, e.g., TAS Report, supra note 293 (“There have been approximately 4,680 changes to the tax 
code since 2001, an average of more than one a day.”); see also supra note 61; cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
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to see how allowing additional exemptions would create a significantly greater 
burden than the Internal Revenue Code already imposes.  Further, to the extent 
the burden of administering an opt-out is a valid concern, it is not unique to the 
world of federal taxes.  Unions and pension funds are already required to engage 
in complicated accounting and reporting that distinguishes, for example, be-
tween germane and non-germane expenditures in the union context and be-
tween categories of employees and fiscal obligations in the pension context.299  
Allowing an opt-out for certain taxpayers or employees would certainly be bur-
densome, but it is not readily apparent why the comparative administrative bur-
den would be significantly greater in one context than another. 
Similarly, it is difficult to reconcile the Lee Court’s assumption that allow-
ing an expanded religious opt-out would jeopardize a “comprehensive 
scheme,” presumably because the Government would not receive adequate 
funding if an opt-out were permitted, with the “but-for” version of the least 
restrictive means test that animates the Court’s recent union decisions.300  
Rational people would prefer to get something for free, and so it is safe to 
assume that whether one is talking about taxes, agency fees, or pension con-
tributions, if given the option of not paying while retaining the benefit, many 
would choose to do so.  The reason that we developed a system of laws is the 
recognition of the limits of self-interest as a social organizing principle.301  It 
is not clear why this risk to a “comprehensive scheme” poses a greater threat 
to the general treasury than to unions or pensions or why the burden of proof 
or assumptions about the continued vitality of programs in the absence of full 
funding should be different in the different contexts.302   
A related justification offered in Lee was the concern that “[g]ranting an 
exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the 
employer’s religious faith on the employees,”303 or, more accurately, it makes 
employees bear the cost of their employer’s religious views.  Similarly, in the 
case of a tax, union, or pension dissenter, an exemption would force others 
 
Ct. at 2783 (allowing certain employers a religious-based exemption).   
 299 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 411 (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 20220–20239 (West 2017); supra notes 232–
235 and accompanying text.  But see supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that in Citizens 
United the Supreme Court struck down the PAC requirement for corporate independent expendi-
tures as overly “burdensome”). 
 300 See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text. 
 301 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”). 
 302 If anything, the general treasury fund created from taxes is a larger pool than unions or corpora-
tions, and the federal government seems better positioned to make up any shortfall. 
 303 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).  But see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–83 (finding 
that because female employees could obtain contraception coverage elsewhere, this concern was 
not triggered).  Contra id. at 2799–803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Impeding women’s receipt of ben-
efits ‘by requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded 
and administered] health benefit’ was scarcely what Congress contemplated.”).  
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to internalize greater expenses, spending their money to subsidize the dis-
senter’s right to opt out.  Whether one thinks about this as a First Amend-
ment or a Takings Clause problem, it is not obvious why different assump-
tions would apply to a tax opt-out, or why the externalities would be different 
than in the context of agency fees or pension payments.304  Indeed, in the 
latter cases the impact on individual participants would be more acute as it 
would be less diffuse (i.e., not shared across the entire tax base). 
Another justification offered by the Court in Lee is perhaps its most provoc-
ative: “When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a 
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes 
which are binding on others in that activity.”305  This contention turns on its 
head the argument that a subsidy has been illegally compelled by questioning 
the argument’s very premise; viz., compulsion.  This is not the venue to deter-
mine whether an individual can realistically avoid taxes, unionized employ-
ment, or a mandatory pension scheme, but two points bear noting.  First, to 
the extent the Lee rationale that one who willingly enters a system is bound by 
its terms holds, it applies equally to unions and pensions.  Second, to the extent 
that a greater degree of compulsion triggers greater First Amendment scrutiny 
because the dissenter has no realistic avenue to sail clear of the system, taxes 
raise a greater, not lesser, concern as they are far more difficult to avoid. 
The Lee Court also emphasized that deference was due to legislative judg-
ments about the need for the funding mandate and the lines drawn in the 
granting of exemptions.306  This in itself is more a rule of decision-making 
rather than a theory of decision, and of course public unions and public pen-
sion plans are also creatures of a democratically-elected legislature. 
This point does foreshadow, however, yet another possible distinction be-
tween the compulsion to pay taxes and the compulsion to fund unions and 
pensions, one that appears in the Court’s more recent government speech 
cases.307  The majority in Johanns explained that the new doctrine was sup-
ported by “democratic accountability,” or the notion that government speech 
 
 304 See Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“If . . . one were to 
conclude that Indiana has worked out a way to conscript the union into providing uncompensated 
services to anyone who decides to opt out of union membership, it would become necessary to 
decide whether such a rule is permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as 
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5 
(“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 305 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
 306 Id. at 260–61; see also Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]ax exemptions are a matter of legislative grace.  It does not follow from Congressional action 
on such matters that the Commissioner or the courts are therefore encouraged to carve out excep-
tions to the statutory scheme.” (citations omitted)). 
 307 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. 
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reflects the will of the people as expressed in the voting booth.308  As Justice 
Souter pointed out in his dissent, it is not clear how well this justification actu-
ally aligned with the facts of Johanns.309  In addition, the argument may prove 
too much.  While the Supreme Court has held that an individual does not have 
standing to challenge a federal spending program merely by the virtue of being 
a taxpayer, in the Court’s compelled speech (as opposed to its compelled sub-
sidy) cases, the fact that laws compelling, for example, recitation of the Pledge 
of Allegiance were passed by democratically elected officials did not save them 
from review and rejection.310  Being able to “vote the bums out” is a limited, 
after-the-fact remedy.  Moreover, many taxpayers—including immigrants, 
foreign nationals, residents of the District of Columbia, and corporations—do 
not have voting rights but are still required to pay federal tax. 
As a basis for distinguishing this prong of the Paycheck Problem, “dem-
ocratic accountability” offers, again, a difference in degree rather than kind.  
As discussed above, both unions and corporations provide some form of in-
ternal “democracy,” with procedural protections more robust in the union 
context.  While this satisfies the Court in the corporate context with regard 
to all spending, even political, it appears that it provides no assurances with 
regards to any union functions.  The word “democracy” does not even ap-
pear in Harris.  The Court’s reliance on democratic safeguards to justify com-
pelled subsidies is sporadic at best. 
2.  A Meaningful Distinction 
The rationales offered above do not provide a sound basis for distinguish-
ing objections to being compelled to pay one’s taxes from an objection to 
contributing to a collective bargaining fund or pension plan.  This is because 
they also share another commonality: they all proceed from the assumption 
that the First Amendment harm done by the compelled payment is to one’s 
autonomy, or liberty, interests.  Even the justification of “democratic ac-
countability” appears designed to assuage the indignant individual, not offer 
a chance of meaningful participation in a spending decision.  But autonomy 
does not, and cannot, distinguish one government compulsion from the next.   
Once we move past thinking of the Paycheck Problem through the frame 
of how the compelled payments burden Sam’s personal liberty, the reason 
 
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Some of our cases have justified compelled 
funding of government speech by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic 
accountability.”). 
 308 Id. at 563. 
 309 Id. at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Beef Act does not establish an advertising scheme 
subject to effective democratic checks”). 
 310 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“[No one] who acts under color of 
law is beyond the reach of the Constitution.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). 
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that taxes are different than unions or pensions is obvious.311  The First 
Amendment was designed in the furtherance of a larger purpose: to establish 
the conditions necessary for government to be legitimate and effective.  Al-
lowing anyone with an objection to refuse to contribute to the enterprise 
would threaten not just a regulatory system, but our constitutional structure.  
It would functionally replace majority rule with a widely dispersed minority 
veto power, undermining the system of representative democracy established 
by the Constitution.312   
This leads to a few further observations.  First, the Court is not unaware 
of this argument.  It was raised in Justice Breyer’s dissent in United Foods 
quoted above,313 and in dicta twenty-eight years ago in Keller, the challenge 
to mandatory state bar fees:   
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds 
express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern 
to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process 
of government as we know it radically transformed.314   
But it appears rarely, seldom in the majority, and as a supporting rather 
than decisive factor.  As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, one finds at 
best “scattered references” to this constitutional purpose of democratic le-
gitimacy, so prominent in campaign finance cases and even beginning to 
infuse commercial speech cases, in the Court’s compelled subsidization 
cases.315  Indeed, even though Justice Souter cited Keller in his dissent in Jo-
hanns, he appeared to view it as a pragmatic rather than constitutional con-
sideration.316  This may be because of the roots of the compelled subsidy 
doctrine in the Court’s compelled speech cases, which were heavily con-
cerned with individual liberty interests. 
Second, as demonstrated by the analysis above, First Amendment auton-
omy objections provide a poor touchstone to evaluate compelled subsidies to 
collective schemes.  As Dean Robert Post has observed, “The difficulty with 
 
 311 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 312 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Frag-
mentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L. J. 804, 807 (2014) (suggesting that 
“[rights-oriented] approaches can spawn, and have spawned, doctrines and policies that undermine 
the capacity of the democratic system as a whole to function effectively”). 
 313 See supra note 79. 
 314 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he reason for permitting the government 
to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the govern-
ment is representative of the people.”).   
 315 Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1087, 1127–28 (2005) (noting that “these have remained voices in the wilderness, as most 
justices and many commentators still hold fast to the idea that the harm is to individual dissenters”).  
 316 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, 
government has to say something.”). 
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regarding autonomy as a fundamental First Amendment interest is that it is 
omnipresent; every restriction and compulsion will to some degree compro-
mise autonomy.”317  The problem is not just that entertaining autonomy ob-
jections fails to offer a limiting principle for the Paycheck Problem; it is that 
it tilts towards anarchy.318  Taken to their logical limits, “conscience” objec-
tions may have the effect of actually working against what most recognize to 
be the primary purpose of the First Amendment—to preserve, in the words 
of the Buckley Court, “discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifica-
tions of candidates.”319   
Third, “freedom of belief” objections to compelled subsidy cases short-
circuit the traditional First Amendment free speech balancing test.  It is not 
clear what kind of work tailoring can do when a “conscience” objection is 
raised.  When access to the marketplace of ideas is limited, a reasonable “tai-
loring” question may be whether the claimant has other ways to make his or 
her voice heard.  Tax resisters, for example, retain the ability to petition the 
government, seek to change the legislature, post their views on line, or engage 
in other democratic activities.  Union dissenters can speak up at school board 
meetings, write their representative, or even file a high-profile lawsuit.  When 
the objection is that a law infringes on one’s concept of self, however, there 
is no ready work-around.320  Indeed, the best way to explain the restrictive 
“but-for” test the Court applied in Harris is to understand the agency fee as 
impeding an individual’s sense of personal autonomy rather than her access 
to the “marketplace of ideas.”   
The Court’s expansive First Amendment penumbra, its heightened scru-
tiny for even the most “mundane” or indirect of communications, and its 
emphasis on the role of the First Amendment as a defender of individual 
autonomy threatens to spark a deregulatory cascade.  But this may merely 
be a parade of horribles (or an argument for reversing course in the union 
cases).  With a new ninth Justice, the Supreme Court is, perhaps, at a cross-
roads.  The next Part contemplates a new path forward.   
III.  THE PATH FORWARD:  THREE OPTIONS 
The discussion above reveals the line-drawing challenges inherent in a 
First Amendment jurisprudence based on individual autonomy interests.  It 
 
 317 Post, supra note 29, at 226. 
 318 Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 341 (2011). 
 319 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); see also id. (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that 
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” 
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).   
 320 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that 
the “clash between appellee’s religious obligation and his civic obligation is irreconcilable”). 
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also demonstrates that current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides a the-
oretical basis for Sam, or any public employee, to assert opt-out rights under 
the First Amendment as to both his union and pension payments.  This result 
may please pure libertarians (and, of course, Sam), but it is unlikely to satisfy 
the vast majority of those who recognize the value of external constraints to 
solve structural issues in the marketplace and in governance.  The purpose 
of engaging in the analysis above is not to green-light thousands of lawsuits 
by employees unhappy with how their money is spent.  It was to illustrate 
that in seeking to avoid one “slippery slope”—“ad hoc” balancing of First 
Amendment rights and insidious governmental limits on expression—the 
Court is heading towards another, one in which speech, conduct, and money 
are so muddled that a large swath of government regulation is constitution-
ally suspect.321  The discussion below suggests three paths forward and con-
siders how the Paycheck Problem might be resolved under each of them. 
A.  The “Functional” Path 
One approach the Court might take would be to pull back from some of 
its more recent and expansive statements of First Amendment rights and re-
establish lines drawn in earlier cases that distinguish among kinds of speech, 
burden, speakers, and scrutiny level, returning to the framework that guided 
First Amendment analysis for several decades.  Of particular relevance to the 
Paycheck Problem, under this approach the Court would re-affirm the notion 
that laws regulating commercial speech receives more permissive review than 
those affecting political speech, and it would recognize that the government 
gets more latitude when it restricts speech while acting as an employer than it 
does when acting as a sovereign.322   
The Court would also wind back the language in Knox and Harris (and 
suggested in Hobby Lobby) equating compelled funding with compelled speech 
and recognize that requiring someone to pay something is meaningfully dif-
ferent than requiring someone to do something.323  Until Knox and Harris, the 
Supreme Court had observed this distinction.  For example, while the gov-
ernment can require Sam to pay taxes, it cannot require him to recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance, recite an oath promising not to overthrow the govern-
ment, or expressly oppose prostitution.324   
 
 321 See supra note 270. 
 322 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (setting 
forth the “Pickering principle,” allowing the government to impose speech restrictions as a condition 
of public employment that it could not impose under the First Amendment); see also Harris v. Quinn, 
134 S. Ct. 2618, 2654–56 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the relevance of the Pickering 
principle to the question of mandatory agency fees for public unions). 
 323 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 324 See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2331–32 (2013); 
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Scholars who have analyzed the issue of indirect speech have reached a 
similar conclusion.  Shortly after United Foods was decided, Gregory Klass 
sought to identify the constitutional right infringed in compelled subsidy of 
speech cases.325  He considered and rejected two possibilities: that a com-
pelled subsidy interest is rooted in an individual’s freedom of belief (as artic-
ulated in Abood) or in an individual’s freedom of speech (as implied in Buckley).  
As to the former, Klass observed that while “it is often central to our most 
deeply held beliefs that we be able to express them in words” and thus laws 
that compel speech impinge directly on our ability to communicate who we 
are and what we value, laws that require the subsidization of speech do not 
impinge the freedom of belief in the same way.326  First, there is less moral 
content in the act of underwriting an activity than actually performing it 
(consider, perhaps, some of your own investments).327  Second, the “mere act 
of paying a mandatory assessment does not identify the payer with the mes-
sage her payments help fund [and,] . . . [c]onsequently, the mere act of pay-
ing does not interfere with the dissenter’s ability to express her beliefs.”328   
As to whether a subsidy implicates an individual’s freedom of speech, 
Professor Klass observed that a required payment “is neither intended as a 
communicative act nor understood as one.”329  We may look up someone’s 
political contribution record and form opinions about him from candidates 
to whom he had voluntarily donated, but we do not meet a public school 
teacher and assume that because she is required to pay her agency fee we 
know what her views are on class size, structured lay-offs, or the Common 
Core Standards, nor even that she is a union member.  Nor do we meet 
fellow taxpayers and assume we are all in agreement on government policies 
and priorities.  In this context, a mandatory subsidy does not infringe on 
one’s freedom of speech.330   
 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 513 (1958); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
624 (1943). 
 325 See Klass, supra note 315, at 1089. 
 326 Id. at 1115. 
 327 Id. at 1115–16.  The Court in Hobby Lobby functionally elided action and payment in holding that 
the RFRA does not allow the Court “to say that [the asserted] religious beliefs are mistaken or 
insubstantial.”  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). 
 328 Klass, supra note 315, at 1116–17. 
 329 Id. at 1124. 
 330 Id.  In contrast, a voluntary payment may possess some value as symbolic speech.  Id. at 1118 (citing 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).  For this reason, as I have argued in another venue, we should 
recognize the First Amendment rights of both those who want to make voluntary donations and 
those that feel coerced into doing so.  See Mueller, supra note 286, at 1832–33 (arguing that while a 
political donation may technically be voluntary, many contributors do not feel as though they can 
say no and consequentially give far more than they otherwise would). 
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Of course, this approach may well describe a golden era of First Amend-
ment doctrine as it never actually existed.331  It also does not resolve many 
difficult questions of line drawing and balancing.  It does, however, lead us 
away from an absolutist approach in which any infringement on speech or 
one’s “freedom of belief” is cause to overturn a law or, in Sam’s case, prohibit 
the compelled payment.  It re-introduces nuance into the equation.332 
For the Paycheck Problem, the result of a turn down this path would be, 
to some extent, a return to status quo.  Sam could not sue to opt out of paying 
a portion of his taxes, and while he would not have to support his union’s 
political activities so long as he remains not a member, he would still have to 
pay his agency fee.  The question of the pension contribution is more difficult, 
however.  Unless the Supreme Court truly backtracks and reverses Citizens 
United, Sam’s mandatory contribution requires him to fund political activities 
of a corporation, in effect supplementing the political funding preferences of 
corporate directors.333  This is exactly what Abood banned in 1977 and, as 
demonstrated above, the two contexts share significant overlap.334   
B.  The “Individual” Path 
A second path would be to accept the autonomy interest that is driving 
the Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence, but to demand more 
rigor in its application.  As described above, the tax, union, and pension 
schemes to which Sam objects do more than extract money from him.  They 
provide a benefit under terms in which others in the scheme—e.g., the union 
and its members—cannot opt out of providing that benefit.  None of these 
are pure libertarian systems that one can exit without creating externalities. 
This observation recently prompted Cynthia Estlund to propose that the 
only way to ascertain the degree of First Amendment burden that one aspect 
of labor laws—agency fees—places on an actor in the system is to consider 
 
 331 Cf. P. Gorden Lippy, So, Mr. Trump, Exactly When Was America Great?, DAILY KOS (Sept. 7, 2015), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/9/7/1419125/-So-Mr-Trump-exactly-when-was-Amer-
ica-great. 
 332 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 
463, 493 (2015) (presenting “a plea for judicial open-mindedness, sensitivity to nuance, and a meas-
ure of old-fashioned humility”). 
 333 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 90 (“The basic problem arises from the fact that political 
spending decisions may be a product not merely of a business judgment regarding the firm’s strat-
egy, but also of the directors’ and executives’ own political preferences and beliefs.  Political spend-
ing might often have consequences that are exogenous to the firm’s performance . . . .”). 
 334 In Citizens United the Court rejected as a compelling interest the potentially distorting impact of 
accumulated wealth, but its discussion of the issue makes it clear that what it was really dismissing 
was a compelling interest in leveling the campaign funding playing field.  See Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).  As demonstrated above and in the Court’s recent analysis in Harris, 
Sam’s objection to his pension contribution is a liberty interest, not an equality interest. 
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the challenged provision in the context of all the mutual benefits and obliga-
tions the law imposes.335  Professor Estlund focused her inquiry on the union 
context, but her analysis bears on other areas of compelled subsidy as well.  
She reasoned that “[u]nions are distinct constitutional actors governed by an 
array of unusual rights, privileges, responsibilities and duties, the whole of 
which ought to be considered in assessing a challenge to any of the parts.”336  
This argument echoes Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lehnert, quoted above, but 
with an important caveat: “Where he invokes the ‘free rider’ problem as a 
‘compelling state interest’ justifying the agency fee requirement,” Estlund ar-
gues that “no significant constitutional infringement arises, and no compel-
ling state interest need be identified, because the agency fee is offset and jus-
tified by the costs (to the union) and benefits (to the individual) of union 
representation.”337  It is a value-for-money exchange. 
Catherine Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou recently engaged in a similar 
analysis, although rather than focusing on the standard of review, they ar-
gued that a proper balancing of First Amendment interests in agency fee 
cases must account not only for the rights of dissenters, but also the First 
Amendment rights of the union and its members.338  Even under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, agency fees would pass constitutional muster because  
they protect three sets of interests simultaneously: nonmembers from having 
to subsidize the political and ideological pursuits of the union, union mem-
bers from having to subsidize the political and ideological beliefs of non-
members, and unions who strive to protect their workers’ interests and can 
only do so when they are able to fully participate in the political landscape.339   
These arguments suggest an autonomy-focused approach that would per-
mit compelled subsidies only if two conditions are satisfied: first, the chal-
lenged payments are reasonably related to a regulatory scheme that provides 
a benefit; and second, any opt-out would impact the expressive interests of 
others bound in the scheme.  Under this approach, expenditures with no 
reasonable relation to the benefit provided, such as certain investments in 
political activism, would be walled off from compulsory funding, but funding 
for services that an entity is bound to provide and that offer a benefit to the 
dissenter would be permissible.  Conversely, if a dissenter could opt out of 
receiving a benefit, he would be able to opt out of the compelled funding.  
This point reinforces the conclusion that one cannot opt out of taxes; it is 
impossible, after all, to avoid the benefits provided by government spending, 
however much one might disagree with some of it.   
 
 335 See Estlund, supra note 95, at 213. 
 336 Id. at 206. 
 337 Id. at 220.  
 338 Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 28, at 442–43. 
 339 Id. at 491. 
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As a descriptive and normative proposition, this approach is appealing.  It 
provides a better account of the forces at play in compelled subsidy cases, and 
the various constitutional interests implicated, than the Court’s recent decisions 
in this area.  It also works with the Roberts Court’s focus on the First Amend-
ment as a protector of individual autonomy, although it demands that the scope 
of the inquiry be broadened to recognize all relevant autonomy interests.   
Nevertheless, although it may satisfy the Court’s concern for autonomy in-
terests, this proposal may be at odds with the Court’s current “absolutist” ap-
proach to First Amendment cases.340  With few exceptions, the Court seems to 
be moving away from the kind of balancing approach suggested here, as demon-
strated by its reliance on “corporate democracy” to dismiss concerns about dis-
senting shareholders in Citizens United and its disregard for the additional costs its 
Hobby Lobby decision created for the government or employees.  Relatedly, this 
proposal is susceptible to the same criticism that animated Justice Breyer’s dissent 
in United Foods: under it, the government might be more exposed to First Amend-
ment challenges when it takes a light regulatory hand rather than when it enacts 
comprehensive legislation binding others in a scheme.341   
How would the Paycheck Problem resolve itself along this path?  As noted 
above, Sam would have no constitutional objection to taxes; he receives a 
benefit from them and any exit is likely to create increased costs for others in 
the system.  Likewise the agency fee, which already excludes non-germane 
political and ideological expenditures, would likely be viewed as an accepta-
ble accommodation of the constitutional interests of the various parties in-
volved.  Pension contributions, however, would continue to be problematic 
so long as corporations are allowed to make unlimited political expenditures.  
Notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Citizens United that political dollars 
need not be kept in a separate account of voluntary contributions, to the ex-
tent one conceives of a corporation as a group of individuals who have com-
bined capital, the result in Citizens United clearly elevated the core First 
Amendment interests of some members over others.342 
One might imagine two responses under this approach defending the sta-
tus quo and denying investors’ constitutional interests in how their money is 
spent.  First, one might argue that a corporation’s political spending decisions 
 
 340 See supra notes 37–39. 
 341 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 428 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s “unreasoned distinction between heavily regulated and less heavily regulated speakers” 
because it “could lead to less First Amendment protection in that it would deprive the former of 
protection”). 
 342 But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A corporation is simply a form 
of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.  An established body of law specifies 
the rights and obligations of the people . . . who are associated with a corporation in one way or 
another.  When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the pur-
pose is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
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are reasonably related to the benefit received by the investor.  This is a de-
batable, fact-specific proposition that cannot be resolved here.  Professors 
Bebchuk and Jackson have offered several reasons that the political prefer-
ences (and spending) of a corporation’s directors might diverge from the 
views of the shareholders and the interests of the company.343  One obvious 
area of such divergence might be issues relating to corporate governance or 
shareholder rights.344  For now it is enough to note that these arguments 
would also open the door to allowing union agency fees to be used on political 
spending on the same theory, upending the compromise struck in Street and 
Abood.345  Second, one might argue, as the Court suggested in Lee, that an 
employee agrees to fund corporate political speech when she enters into pub-
lic employment and is required to make pension contributions.  Again, this 
raises symmetry issues with unions, especially where someone is hired into 
an existing union shop.  Even if it did not, history rebuts this account.  Before 
Citizens United, the last time corporations and unions could make independent 
expenditures was 1947, long before pensions seriously invested in private 
companies.346  It is highly improbable that any such trade-off was contem-
plated as a part of the pension scheme. 
Last, to the extent the pension is a defined contribution plan as opposed to 
a defined benefit plan—meaning that the benefit paid out correlates to the 
money paid in—Sam may be able to opt out of his pension scheme, although 
this would mean foregoing a significant earnings advantage.  Opting out of a 
union benefit is less feasible.  An objecting police officer or teacher might the-
oretically be able to forego salary increases and health insurance improvements 
negotiated by the union, but it would be more difficult to cordon her off from 
negotiated employment conditions like vacation time, class size, hiring and fir-
ing seniority, and shift hours.  Indeed, allowing an individual employee to re-
ject the terms of collective bargaining would undermine the chief benefits em-
ployers receive from unions—namely, administrative convenience.347  
C.  The “Structural” Path 
A final approach would build on the analysis above and re-frame the First 
Amendment as protecting a larger constitutional system, one in which indi-
 
 343 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 90. 
 344 Id. at 91. 
 345 See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 801 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that in fact, unions’ “political side . . . is as organic, as inured a part of [their] philosophy 
and practice . . . as their immediate bread-and-butter concerns”). 
 346 See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
 347 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–50, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 578 U.S. 1083 (2016) 
(per curiam) (No. 14-915). 
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vidual liberty is important but not always a “trump.”  Even beyond com-
pelled subsidy cases, many laws impede free will or require someone to indi-
rectly support something with which she may disagree.348  If these were all 
potential First Amendment violations, challenges to previously unobjection-
able regulations would threaten to overrun the courts and, of greater con-
cern, dilute the actual purpose of the First Amendment and the Constitution 
it supports.  We had been able to ignore the expansion of the autonomy in-
terest in free speech jurisprudence because we had gatekeepers such as cate-
gories of speech and scrutiny levels that kept it in check.  But if the Court is 
going to shine a First Amendment light on all regulation, it may be time to 
develop a more robust theory of the First Amendment. 
This approach does not ignore the autonomy interests that undergird 
much of the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence.  Rather, it rec-
ognizes that the Constitution’s preservation of individual autonomy is pur-
poseful.  We protect it because we value an individual’s participation in soci-
ety and in the democratic process.349  The legitimacy of the constitutional 
structure rests on the presumption that people will participate, both in the 
selection of leaders and in the formation of public policy.  Recognizing this 
allows us to see that what we might call “exit” actions, such as Sam contem-
plates in the Paycheck Problem, pose unique First Amendment challenges in 
that they not only question the legitimacy of the government to craft collec-
tive solutions to what are often collective action problems—the very purpose, 
some would say, of government—but also force us to evaluate how our sys-
tem of republican self-government can function if everyone can pick up their 
metaphorical ball and go home. 
Thinking systemically about the purpose of the Constitution is not a new 
endeavor.  Thirty years ago Owen Fiss proposed a “structural approach” in 
which “the enrichment of public debate is substituted for the protection of 
autonomy” as the impetus of the First Amendment, and “free speech oper-
ates as a justification rather than as a limit on state action.”350  More than 
 
 348 See Post, supra note 29, at 210 (citing Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), 
in which a father in a child custody dispute objected that an order requiring him to pay a portion 
of the mother’s attorney’s fees violated his First Amendment right not to be compelled to fund 
speech with which he disagreed).  
 349 See id. at 227 (“The interest of autonomy, which would be compromised by compulsory taxa-
tion[,] . . . does not well explain the configuration of existing or desirable First Amendment juris-
prudence.  The interest of participation in public debate, by contrast, . . . does have considerable 
explanatory power . . . .”); cf. Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1167, 1210 (2001) (“It is intolerable that the First Amendment, long treasured as an essential feature 
of self-government, has been made by the Court into an instrument for the subordination of the 
democratic process to government controlled by the highest bidders.”). 
 350 Fiss, supra note 46, at 1419. 
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thirty years before that, Alexander Mieklejohn argued that the First Amend-
ment did not protect an individual right so much as a system of self-govern-
ment and political freedom; the First Amendment, he noted, does not state 
that the government may not abridge speech, but “the freedom of speech.”351  
More recently, in his book Citizens Divided, Robert Post suggested that the 
twin pillars of the First Amendment are “democratic legitimation” and “dis-
cursive democracy”; in Citizens United, he posited, the Supreme Court had 
erred in elevating the latter over the former.352   
The purpose of the First Amendment will not be resolved here, nor does 
it need to be.  It is enough to re-direct our attention in the Paycheck Problem 
to the structural issues it might pose.  Under this approach, we worry about 
compelled subsidies because they might skew either the political process or 
public discourse in a way that contravenes the First Amendment’s purpose.  
Taking a lead from Post’s analysis, the risk can further be broken down into 
two separate concerns: first, that a compelled subsidy that is aggregated and 
spent by another with whom one is not politically aligned on an election or 
policy question might undermine the legitimacy of the political process; and 
second, that a compelled subsidy spent to promote a particular public policy 
might impact government decision-making in a way disproportionate to the 
actual support for that policy, either because it drowns out dissenting voices 
or because it does not leave sufficient alternate avenues for expression.  To 
collapse the inquiry back down to its essence: is the system sound, and can 
you meaningfully participate in it?353  
It bears noting that evaluating system integrity and meaningful participa-
tion in an electoral process may well have different touchstones than in public 
discourse.  There are reasons to more closely safeguard the former.  First, 
unlike public policy discussions, an election is not an adaptable, iterative pro-
cess; once a vote happens, that choice is locked in for two, four, or six years.  
Second, to the extent preventing corruption continues to be a government 
interest, the personal stakes and, again, winner-take-all nature of elections 
may make them more susceptible to manipulation.  Third, our constitutional 
expectations about the democratic process are different in the two cases.  Our 
right to vote is deeply personal and inalienable, and any manipulation of our 
exercise of the franchise more directly impacts our interaction with our sys-
tem of government than our views on various public policy issues, which we 
process into a tapestry that may ultimately inform our vote.  The courts, for 
 
 351 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 19. 
 352 POST, supra note 46, at 36; see also id. at 93 (concluding that “the Court in its recent campaign 
finance cases has posed the wrong constitutional questions and has failed to consider the material 
constitutional facts”). 
 353 See generally Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 655 (2017) 
(re-conceptualizing voting and campaign finance cases under a proposed “right to participate”). 
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example, recognize the value of equality in elections but have consistently 
rejected its significance in campaign finance cases.354 
Under this approach, Sam’s compelled payment of taxes would pass mus-
ter.  In addition to the structural arguments raised above, it is worth noting 
that taxes do not impinge his ability to fully participate the electoral process 
in any way, and they pose only limited constraints on his ability to engage 
with public discourse on matters of policy.  Sam is still, as the lower courts 
noted in an earlier tax resister case, “free to announce and publish” his opin-
ions about matters of public concern.355  Indeed, to the extent that one will 
not speak up unless inspired to do so by a message one opposes (consider 
much of social media), it may be that the compulsion to pay taxes inspires 
greater participation in public debate.   
The case of Sam’s pension and union payments is, as noted above, differ-
ent from his taxes as both corporations and unions are extra-constitutional; 
they are not in themselves necessary for government.  Nevertheless, in both 
cases Sam’s objection to his payments rests on the fact that they fund expres-
sion likely to shape public discourse and political outcomes.  Applying the 
structural line of analysis, a court would be tasked with considering whether 
assessment unduly skews either process.  One way to approach this might be 
a test with two prongs: first, is the assessment itself protected by meaningful 
safeguards; and second, does the assessment compromise the dissenter’s abil-
ity to meaningfully participate in the electoral process or in public discourse?   
The devil is of course in the details, but we can think in broad terms about 
how this might play out in the Paycheck Problem.  As to the first question, the 
democratic safeguards are more robust in the union context than in the pen-
sion one.  Union shops can only be formed once a majority of employees vote 
to do so, all represented employees are permitted to join as voting members, 
and any employee—union member or not—can speak in school board meet-
ings and in public about matters of policy.356  If anything, the fact that dissent-
ing members may opt out of full union membership allows them to telegraph 
a message of disapproval to both the union officers and to their employers 
about the union’s activities and positions.  Further, agency fees can only be 
spent for limited purposes, for which the union must provide an accounting.  
Political contributions remain voluntary.  As discussed above, none of these 
safeguards are available in the pension context.  Even if members of the state 
 
 354 Compare Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1130 (2016) (reaffirming the principle of “one-person, 
one-vote”), with McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“No matter how desirable it 
may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level the playing field’ . . . .”). 
 355 Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1216–17 (1985). 
 356 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). 
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pension board have political accountability, there are no avenues for partici-
pation by investors.  As seen in the discussion of “corporate democracy” above, 
in fact “a core goal of corporate law is to give directors and officers legal au-
thority to act in ways with which shareholders may profoundly disagree.”357 
As to the second question—does the assessment impede a dissenter’s abil-
ity to participate—here too the union fees raise fewer concerns.  This is due 
in part to the fact that, in contrast to those making mandatory pension con-
tributions, no one can be compelled to fund unions’ non-germane political 
activity.  (A dissenting employee might argue that they could better use their 
agency fees for advocacy if they did not have to direct them to their union, 
but again pensions would implicate similar if not greater concerns, as pension 
contributions are typically far higher than agency fees.358)  Indeed, under any 
of the approaches proposed here, the asymmetry between union and corpo-
rate political spending remains an untenable problem. It is particularly acute 
in an environment where public-private partnerships, quasi-public regula-
tory bodies, and corporate strategies to grow profits not through the markets 
but via government engagement are more and more present.359 
Further, while neither the union nor pension contributions prevent anyone 
from speaking out in public, corporate investments suffer from a lack of disclo-
sure, making it difficult for an investor to recognize when speech on a particu-
lar issue is warranted.  It is not unusual for individuals to decide to engage in 
public debate only upon learning about controversial statements or events that 
merit a response.  If we cannot identify these—and currently the SEC does not 
require corporations to disclose political spending—then it is hard to say that 
the ability to participate is meaningful.  For reasons discussed above, the lack 
of transparency and exit rights is particularly troubling in the political context, 
but it also has implications for a corporation’s other expressive activities and 
may give a constitutional dimension to calls for greater disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Paycheck Problem provides as a framework to consider the trajec-
tory of the Court’s recent First Amendment cases and its implications for the 
government’s ability to craft collective solutions to systemic problems.  We 
live in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected society.  Yet as 
 
 357 Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 7. 
 358 See supra note 258. 
 359 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Ron Fein, Corporations Are Perverting the Notion of Free Speech, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/corporations-are-perverting-notion-free-speech-
359785 (“Companies increasingly place bets not on technological innovation but on legal and political 
‘innovation’—what business schools teach under the Orwellian name ‘non-market strategies.’  As 
corporate success shifts toward extracting wealth via the political and judicial systems, career ad-
vancement will depend on learning the levers of power in courts, legislatures and regulatory agen-
cies, and different skills and forms of ‘talent’ will be rewarded.”). 
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movements from school choice to Brexit demonstrate, the question of when 
an individual should have the right to exercise an exit strategy is only going 
to become more pressing in the coming decades.  The Supreme Court’s com-
pelled subsidy cases raise issues that are central to our concepts of self-deter-
mination, governmental power, and social structures, and they provide guid-
ance as to how we should respond when any of these constructs come into 
conflict.  This makes it all the more unfortunate that this area of jurispru-
dence has also been one of the Court’s least consistent.  The analysis above 
illustrates several serious shortcomings with the Supreme Court’s current ap-
proach to compelled subsidy of speech cases, including a failure to recognize 
the implications of its recent union jurisprudence for cases arising in the cor-
porate context, an overemphasis on the First Amendment’s role protecting 
individual autonomy, an undifferentiated expansion of the First Amendment 
“penumbra,” and a blurring of the line the Court has long marked between 
money and speech.  With a new Justice on the Court, it is time to identify a 
path forward that can bring more coherence to a disorganized but vitally 
important body of law.360 
  
 
 360 As this Article was in the final stage of preparation for publication, the Supreme Court heard argu-
ments in Janus v. AFSCME.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 134.  Due to publication 
constraints, I was not able to give full consideration to this case throughout this Article.  However, 
the oral argument indicated little to change the analysis in this Article, nor did it suggest that any 
Justice has altered his or her views since the Court deadlocked on Friedrichs.  The tensions noted in 
this Article among the Court’s various lines of compelled subsidy jurisprudence went entirely un-
explored.  No one mentioned the Court's ruling in Citizens United upholding the use of corporate of 
general treasury funds for political advertisements, and in fact the author of that opinion, Justice 
Kennedy, appeared to disfavor the union, admonishing State Respondent’s counsel that, “What 
we’re talking about here is . . . compelled subsidization of a private party, a private party that ex-
presses political views constantly.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 134, at 36.  Justice 
Gorsuch, who will likely be the swing vote, said nothing during the argument. 
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